On E¤ective Minimax Payo¤s and Unequal Discounting
نویسنده
چکیده
We show that the Folk theorem in Wen (1994) may not fully characterize the subgame-perfect equilibrium payo¤ set in a repeated game with unequal discounting, where a players equilibrium payo¤ could be strictly less than her e¤ective minimax payo¤ . Keywords: repeated games, e¤ective minimax values, heterogenous discounting JEL Classi cation: C73
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