E¢ciency of Large Double Auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
We consider large double auctions with private values. Values need be neither symmetric nor independent. Multiple units may be owned or desired. Participation may be stochastic. We introduce a very mild notion of “a little independence.” We prove that all non-trivial equilibria which satisfy this notion are asymptotically e¢cient. For any ® > 0; ine¢ciency disappears at rate 1=n2¡®.
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