Running Head : ON MOTIVATIONAL READINESS 1 Psychological Review , In Press On Motivational Readiness

The construct of motivational readiness is introduced and explored. Motivational readiness is the willingness or inclination, whether or not ultimately realized, to act in the service of a desire. Building on prior relevant conceptions which include, among others, animal learning models (Hull, 1943; Spence, 1956; Tolman, 1955), and personality approaches (e.g., Atkinson, 1964; Lewin, 1935), a general theory of motivational readiness is presented. Major parameters of this theory include the magnitude of a Want state (i.e., individual’s desire of some sort), and the Expectancy of being able to satisfy it. The Want (W) is assumed to be the essential driver of readiness: Whereas some degree of readiness may exist in the absence of Expectancy (E), all readiness is abolished in the absence of desire (W). The concept of incentive is conceptualized in terms of a Match between the contents of the Want and perceived situational affordances. Whereas in classic models incentive was portrayed as a first order determinant of motivational readiness, it is depicted here as a second order factor which affects readiness via its impact on the Want and/or the Expectancy. A heterogeneous body of evidence for the present theory is reviewed, converging from different domains of psychological research. The theory’s relation to its predecessors and its unique implications for new research hypotheses also are discussed. ON MOTIVATIONAL READINESS 3 On Motivational Readiness “Between the motion and the act ... Between the desire and the spasm ... Between the potency and the existence ... Falls the shadow” (T.S. Eliot). Willing does not necessarily produce doing, and the road from awakened desire to concerted action often is tortuous: First, the desire itself might be fleeting and whimsical. An initial enthusiasm about a Caribbean vacation might be ephemeral and soon curbed by exigencies of workaday living. An impulse to splurge on a sports car, become fluent in French, or embark on an African Safari may give way to pressing concerns that ban dreamy fantasies from serious consideration. Secondly, even if powerful and persistent a desire might appear unrealistic. A romantic “crash” on a movie actor, the boss or the therapist may be quite intense and wrenching—yet its patent impossibility may forestall any concrete move toward its realization. A prisoner may ardently covet freedom yet see no feasible way of fleeing confinement, etc. Obviously, willing is not irrelevant to doing, and often it does culminate in behavior aimed at the satisfaction of one’s desire: A feeling of thirst may well prompt drinking, the feeling of hunger, eating, and an ambition for athletic attainment, the adoption of a tough training regimen. In short, wanting typically constitutes a necessary, yet an insufficient condition for intentional action. We call this psychological state of willing motivational readiness, and we define it as the inclination or tendency, whether or not ultimately consummated, to gratify some Want, whether implicit or explicit. Our construct of motivational readiness refers to a core psychological phenomenon addressed by major motivational theorists, albeit under different labels. In this vein, Lewin (1935) described a state of tension “expressed by restless behavior” (pp. 94-95) and dissipating upon need fulfillment. Hull (1951) wrote of a “reaction potential” (sEr) that may lead to an overt ON MOTIVATIONAL READINESS 4 reaction, but it may also be so weak (or opposed by concurrent reaction potentials) that it produces no apparent reaction whatsoever. In like manner, Spence (1937) labeled as an “excitatory potential” (pp. 430-432) the tendency of the stimulus to evoke the response of approaching it. Atkinson’s (1964) central phenomenon of interest was what he called the “tendency to act” (pp. 274-275), that is, again, a potentiality or a readiness to engage in a given behavior that may or may not take place after all. The overriding interest on the part of major psychological theorists in (concepts akin to) motivational readiness isn’t hard to fathom. This topic addresses the cradle of motivation and the quintessence of its inception. The ingredients of readiness and their interrelations are key to understanding how forces that determine action arise and what the motivational roles are of incentives and rewards. In what follows, we outline a general model of readiness formation and discuss convergent evidence for the model from diverse lines of psychological inquiry. From Readiness to Action The conditions under which motivational readiness translates into action have not been elaborated much by historic models of motivation, though Tolman (1955) mentioned the positive factors that increase performance [e.g., (magnitude of the) “need-push” (p. 319) and/or positive valence of the reward] and contrasted them with negative factors that decrease or undermine it (e.g., the need to avoid work, and the negative valence of the work that must be done, Tolman, 1955, p. 319). Lewin (1935), too, distinguished between driving and constraining forces, the former promoting the occurrence of a behavior, the latter reducing its likelihood. Beyond these preliminary treatments, we portray the transition from motivational readiness to goal formation in terms of a dual-threshold function of readiness magnitude and Expectancy. In turn, Motivation Intensity theory (Brehm & Self, 1989) and Cognitive Energetics theory (CET; Kruglanski, ON MOTIVATIONAL READINESS 5 Bélanger, Chen, Kopetz, Pierro, & Mannetti, 2012) address the contrasting forces that prompt the pursuit of goals, once these are formed. We revisit these notions at a later juncture. Operationalizing Readiness How can motivational readiness be assessed? Hull (1951) discussed "concrete reactions which must possess some objectively measurable ...indication of the intensity of the tendency to perform the act. An obvious case of such an indication is seen in the intensity of struggling movements (in grams), or the amount of salivary secretion (in cubic centimeters) produced by hungry organisms when presented with not-quite accessible food" (p. 13). Pavlov’s dog responding to a bell that serves as a conditioned stimulus (CS) for food (Pavlov, 1906) exhibits a readiness to eat, with magnitude of the dog’s salivary response reflecting the degree of readiness. Zener (1937) summarized it as, “a ... reaction describable as looking for, expecting, the fall of food with a readiness to perform the eating behavior which will occur when the food falls” (p. 393, italics added). Lewin (1935, p. 95) inferred motivational tension from behavioral restlessness, as noted earlier. Brain research could offer additional ways to measure readiness. Potentially relevant here is Libet, Gleason, Wright, and Pearl’s (1983) notion of "readiness potential" (RP) defined as a sustained scalp-recorded negativity (ERP) that begins up to a second or more before a self-paced act. In these authors’ 1983 studies, awareness of the urge to move occurred, on average, 300 ms before the onset of activity; in contrast, RP began at least 700 ms before the onset of activity (see also Haggard & Eimer, 1999; Wohlert, 1993). Libet’s et al. (1983) results are supported by research based on other methodologies; their findings have been replicated using fMRI (Lau, Rogers, Haggard, & Passingham, 2004; Soon, Brass, Heinze, & Haynes, 2008), and the notion of readiness potential has been confirmed through research with single-cell recordings in monkeys ON MOTIVATIONAL READINESS 6 as well (Romo & Schulz, 1987). Finally, the use of mouse technology (Vallacher, Nowak, & Kaufman, 1994; Vallacher, Nowak, Froehlich, & Rockloff, 2002) to assess the dynamics of motivational readiness online could also be of use. Where motivation readiness is translated into action, its magnitude may be gauged by intensity of behavioral engagement. Miller (1951, p. 91) described an experiment by Brown (1948) in which albino rats ran down a runway for food, or in order to escape shock. Each animal wore a harness connected to a recording device. When they were prevented from running at a single point in the runway, the strength of their pull could be measured. A monotonic positive relationship was found between strength of the animal's response tendency and strength of the pull, suggesting that both reflect motivational readiness. Higgins (2012b, pp. 247-249) elaborated on the strength of activity engagement tapped by measures such as persistence on a task (i.e., time spent on the activity), and exertion (tapped, e.g., by arm pressure while working). Higgins (2012b) also furnished evidence that strength of engagement intensifies evaluative reactions (Cesario & Higgins, 2008; Higgins, Franks, Pavarini, Sehnert, & Manley, 2013), and hence that it can be partially inferred from magnitude of evaluative reactions, preferences and choices (Chun, Kruglanski, Sleeth-Keppler, & Friedman, 2011). Magnitude of motivational readiness may be also inferred from cardiovascular indices of effort expenditure on a task (in particular, heart rate, and systolic and diastolic blood pressure) but only when the task is manageable and sufficiently important (Wright, 1998). More work on the measurement of readiness seems in order. A Theory of Motivational Readiness (MRT) In what follows, we present our theory of motivational readiness. Our framework builds on prior motivational models and re-examines them in light of contemporary work on motivation. ON MOTIVATIONAL READINESS 7 Specifically, our theory may be regarded as a re-conceptualized version of classic formulations, buttressed by new advances in motivation science and aimed to uncover the “deep structure” of motivational readiness that transcends the paradigmatic specifics of prior conceptions. Basic Concepts and Assumptions Motivational readiness. By motivational readiness we mean a psychological experience of the willingness to attain a given state of affairs. Motivational readiness may be depicted as lying on a dimension of intensity or magnitude, from low to high degrees of readiness. Determinants of motivational readiness. Major historical models of motivational readiness (or kindred concepts) have hinted at several similar factors assumed to jointly determine individuals’ tendency to engage in motivated pursuit. Despite these deep commonalities, the classic models substantially differed from each other in outward appearance, according to the distinct conceptual idioms and research paradigms of the models’ progenitors. Our analysis builds on the earlier formulations and it prunes and expands them. Specifically, we offer a more generalized, but also more refined version of notions inherent (explicitly or implicitly) in prior models, informed by contemporary motivational research. We assume that motivational readiness is determined by an interaction of two essential ingredients: (1) Momentarily activated desire, or Want, (W), and (2) Expectancy that the Want can be gratified. We consider these in turn. The Want. By the Want construct we mean an outcome that a person, or an animal, desires at a given moment. It is generally agreed that the concept of desire represents the core of motivation. As Hobbes (1651) put it: “Life itself ... can never be without desire ...” (p. 49, 1 According to the present analysis, the duration of a state of motivated readiness may vary. Some states of readiness may be relatively enduring (e.g., the readiness to consume a meal if food were to be found). Other states may be short lived, and overridden by competing considerations (e.g., the readiness to aggress against one’s boss). ON MOTIVATIONAL READINESS 8 italics added). In our model, the Want notion includes all types of desires whether of the approach (e.g., food), or the avoidance (e.g., shock) type, regardless of their source, whether based on internal physiological deficits or broad psychogenic needs, and regardless of their modes of origination. In the latter vein, Lewin (1935, p. 87) discussed induced forces based on adult care takers’ epistemic authority in the eyes of young children (see Kruglanski, Raviv, BarTal, Raviv, Sharvit, Ellis, Bar, Pierro, & Mannetti, 2005): The adults proclaim certain objects in the environment to have positive or negative valence, and the children accept their pronouncements, and develop the corresponding Wants or quasi needs to approach or avoid the objects in question. Similarly, Murray (1938) discusses “environmental presses” that elicit actions from persons. Again, however, external presses are likely to activate internal Wants in individuals, just as do deprivation conditions in animal learning studies (e.g., see Hull, 1951), or semantic priming manipulations in social cognition experiments (see Bargh & Bandollar, 1996). In a gist then, the Want construct synthesizes concepts like motive, need, wish, drive or desire by identifying their common essence. Wants may vary in their specificity or dimensionality. A hungry individual may desire food, but how much food and what kind may differ across persons and for the same persons across situations. In some instances, people might find a wide variety of foods appealing. In others they might be fussy and crave special types of food, e.g., sweets, steak, or pickles. In those circumstances, only those foods, and no others, would instill in them the readiness for action. The contents and magnitude of the Want. It is useful to explicitly parse the Want concept into its two fundamental aspects: its content and its magnitude. Clearly separating these two aspects of a desire affords a more precise elucidation of the impact of given organismic and situational conditions on motivational readiness; as shown later, this proves to be especially ON MOTIVATIONAL READINESS 9 important in understanding the impact of incentives on readiness. Essentially, the content aspect pertains to what it is that the individual wants, and the magnitude aspect asks how much he or she desires it. In other words, the content aspect of the Want (Cw) addresses the genre of the felt desire (e.g., to eat, drink, cooperate, acquire a luxury item, or other). In contrast, the magnitude aspect of the Want (MW) refers to the strength of an individual’s wish for the object of her or his desire. The Want vector. The content of the Want (Cw) may be formally represented by a set of numbers or a ‘vector’ (in the matrix-algebraic sense) whose elements depict the desire’s characteristics on a number of relevant dimensions. At times, one might experience a relatively undifferentiated desire of some sort, say the wish to eat something, anything, recognized as edible. In such an instance, one may not care for a specific aspect of the food such as its temperature, its degree of gastronomic sophistication, the type of cuisine it represents, etc. In alternative instances, one might experience a more constrained desire, e.g., for something not only edible but also hot, not only hot but also flavorful, vegetarian, low in calories, etc. Because the content of the Want defines a vector, each of its elements may be characterized by a given magnitude, corresponding to the degree to which the individual cares for each of the dimensions of one’s desire. Expectancy. By Expectancy (E) we mean the subjective probability an individual assigns (consciously or unconsciously) to gratification of the Want. Expectancy may be determined by experience with specific actions that previously had satisfied the Want. Thus, a laboratory rat may follow an “if-then” rule whereby a given action may lead to given consequences. In the 2 According to our CET (Cognitive Energetics Theory), the magnitude aspect isn’t tantamount to the energy aspect, though it refers to mobilization of energy from a pool of resources (see Kruglanski et al., 2012). ON MOTIVATIONAL READINESS 10 (conditioning) example given by Holyoak, Koh, and Nisbett (1989), a laboratory rat may anticipate that “if a tone sounds in the chamber then a shock will occur...” (therefore crouching is indicated, p. 320). In a different example, a driver’s specific knowledge may inform an Expectancy that turning the ignition key would start the engine, etc. The foregoing instances represent cases where individuals trusted their own epistemic authority to derive expectancy from prior experience (Kruglanski et al., 2005), determining one’s general or domain-specific self-efficacy (cf., Bandura, 1977). Often, however, expectancies may derive from information delivered by external authorities, adult care takers, teachers, or experts in various domains (ibid). In other words, expectancies may be based on social influence exerted by trusted epistemic authorities other than oneself. Whereas reliance on own or others’ epistemic authority refers to evidence-based Expectancy, a general proclivity toward optimism (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 2001; Scheier & Carver, 1985; Segerstrom, Taylor, Kemeny, & Fahey, 1998; Wrosch & Scheier, 2003) may constitute an alternative route to Expectancy. Indeed, there is ample evidence that even without experience with specific acts, or social influence from others positive outcome Expectancies (i.e., optimism) lead individuals to initiate or maintain behavior aimed to the satisfaction of an active motive state (Carver & Scheier, 1988). Relations Among Readiness Components Primacy of desire. Even though both Want and Expectancy influence motivational readiness, they are not functionally equivalent in their effects. The Want (desire) seems crucial and indispensible; Expectancy, though contributing to motivational readiness, isn’t as essential. For instance, a starved individual may have a high degree of eating readiness though no food may be available, hence no Expectancy. A prisoner may crave freedom and be motivated to ON MOTIVATIONAL READINESS 11 pursue it, though the Expectancy of liberation may seem to be nil. The popular concept of “hopeless love” implies Want without Expectancy, as does Zajonc’s (1980) famous thesis that “preferences need no inferences” (p. 151). Of interest too, is recent neuroscience work on motivation, which has focused exclusively on desire (its activation by environmental stimuli) and has been rather silent on Expectancy (cf. Berridge, Robinson, & Aldridge, 2009). The role of Expectancy. In contrast to desire, Expectancy alone may not instill readiness, although given some desire it may amplify it. Like a magnifying glass that makes things seem closer, Expectancy makes Want satisfaction appear more (subjectively) realistic. The magnifying property of Expectancy received support in recent research by Higgins, Franks, Pavarini, and Manley (2013) in which a good tasting yogurt tasted better, whereas a bad tasting yogurt tasted worse, when the Expectancy of tasting it was high (versus low). In summary, Expectancy matters, and it may mobilize persons’ energetic resources and channel them toward a given Want. Yet, at the end of the day, it is the Want that essentially drives readiness; in a manner of speaking, it is the “dog” that wags the “tail” of readiness, with Expectancy in an assisting role. In other words, a combination of a high desire (W) and low Expectancy (E) is assumed to induce a higher level of motivational readiness than that of low Want and high Expectancy. For instance, an individual with a burning romantic desire for another, and a relatively low Expectancy of success, would experience a higher degree of motivational readiness than a person with low attraction to another and a considerable Expectancy of success. Weighting the Want and Expectancy components. Granting the overall primacy of Wants over Expectancies, some people (or most people some of the time) may still overor under-weigh either of these ingredients. In this vein, Shah and Higgins (1997) found that ON MOTIVATIONAL READINESS 12 prevention-oriented individuals are less affected by variation in expectations than promotionoriented individuals. In a similar vein, Orehek, Mauro, Kruglanski, and van der Bles (2012) found that people high in the locomotion tendency give more weight to Expectancy considerations (that allow them to maximize movement) and less to value considerations; in contrast, individuals high on the assessment dimension give more weight (wW) to value considerations (related to Want magnitude, designated by W) and less weight (wE) to Expectancy considerations. Formalizing the motivational readiness model. Consistent with the foregoing considerations, our motivational readiness model (MR) may be expressed formally as follows: MR = f(W, E). A more precise form of that function expressing the several assumptive properties of W and E is: (1a) MR = W , where 0 =< E =< 1; that is, where E (i.e., Expectancy) is conceptualized as a subjective probability. The foregoing expression conveys the presumed primacy of W as a contributor to MR. Thus, if E = 0, MR = W, whereas if E = 1, MR = W, indicating that at both upper and lower bounds of E, MR is determined solely by W. As a special case, where W = 0, MR = 0 irrespective of the value of E, whereas where W > 0, MR is above zero as well. Finally, taking into account, the differential weighting of the W and the E discussed above, we have: (1b) MR = wWWE. Interdependence of Wants and Expectancies In classic motivational models, the Want and Expectancy factors are typically portrayed as independent from each other. There is evidence, however, that they there are in fact interdependent and that each may partially determine the other under some conditions. Extant evidence suggests, furthermore, that the directions of these effects may vary according to ON MOTIVATIONAL READINESS 13 specific circumstances. In some cases, the W and E may be related positively;in other cases the relation may be negative. Effects of Wants on Expectancies. (1) Positive impact. The notion that Wants determine Expectancies positively is implied by the familiar notion of “wishful thinking” supported by an appreciable body of research (e.g., Dunning, 1999; Kunda, 1990; Kunda & Sinclair, 1999). In the present context, the concept of wishful thinking suggests that the stronger the Want, the greater should be the Expectancy of its gratification. Direct evidence for this proposition comes from early research by McGuire (1960) in which participants rated both the probability and the desirability of each syllogism in a set being true. McGuire found evidence that the two sets of ratings were significantly correlated, consistent with the wishful thinking notion. (2) Negative impact. The suggestion that Wants can have a negative impact on Expectancies under some conditions follows from research on defensive pessimism (Norem & Cantor, 1986). This work is based on the assumption that for some people at least, and for other people in some situations, importance of an outcome (e.g., the desire for academic success) lowers the Expectancy of success as a strategy for spurring individuals to greater effort. Though originally defensive pessimism was envisaged as a stable dimension of individual differences related to the fear of failure (Ntoumanis, Taylor, & Standage, 2010), more recent work suggests that it can be induced by situational conditions as well. In this vein, Carroll, Sweeny, and Shepperd (2006) reviewed a number of empirical studies about pessimism and suggested that a higher Want for a given outcome may lead to greater pessimism--that is, lowered Expectancy of its attainment. For instance, participants shift from optimistic to pessimistic predictions of testing positive for a medical condition only when the consequences of having the condition are severe, (versus benign; Taylor & Shepperd, 1998). In another study, ON MOTIVATIONAL READINESS 14 students in one experiment were told that there had been an error at the school registrar's office and that 25% of students would be given an additional bill in the mail to make up for the error. Students were more likely to predict that they would receive the bill if they were financially in need (versus financially secure; Shepperd, Findley-Klein, Kwavnick, Walker, & Perez, 2000). Effects of Expectancies on Wants. The interdependence between Wants and Expectancies appears to be reciprocal. Not only do Wants affect Expectancies, but Expectancies apparently also affect Wants. Again, there is evidence that the relation between Expectancies and Wants can be negative in some circumstances and positive in others. (1) Positive impact. Recent evidence attests that Expectancies may have a positive impact on Wants such that the higher the Expectancy, the stronger the Want. Higgins et al. (2013) study referred to earlier supports this possibility. These researchers led undergraduates to believe that they would taste two yogurt flavors (labeled A or B), and then, in the second part of the study, they would try more concentrations within just one of these general flavor categories. In the expressed high likelihood conditions, participants were told either that they had an 80% chance of later trying more yogurt concentrations from A or that they had an 80% chance of later trying more yogurt concentrations from B. In the expressed low likelihood conditions, participants were told either that they had a 20% chance of later trying more yogurt concentrations from B or that they had a 20% chance of later trying more yogurt concentrations from A. Unbeknownst to participants, one yogurt category was pre-tested to be good-tasting (flavored with sugar and nutmeg), and the other yogurt category was pre-tested to be bad-tasting (flavored with clove). In two experimental conditions, then, there was a high probability that participants would later try various concentrations of the good yogurt flavor— the 80% sugar and nutmeg condition, and the 20% clove (and thus 80% sugar and nutmeg) condition. In two additional conditions ON MOTIVATIONAL READINESS 15 there was a high probability of trying the bad yogurt (the 80% clove and 20% sugar and nutmeg conditions) Higgins et al. (2013) predicted and found that participants in both high expressed likelihood conditions (80% likelihood of the good yogurt later; 80% likelihood of the bad yogurt later) evinced stronger evaluative reactions (reflecting the desirability of the yogurts or their Want value) than did participants in the low likelihood conditions (the low expressed likelihood conditions (20% of the good yogurt later; 20% of the bad yogurt later). Specifically, the good yogurt tasted better and the bad yogurt tasted worse in the high versus the low likelihood conditions. (2) Negative impact. The negative effect of Expectancy on Want has to do with the oftenassumed relation between rarity (i.e., low Expectancy) and value (i.e., high desirability). Thus, Atkinson (1957) famously argued that the incentive values of achievement goals are highly dependent upon the subjective probability of success. In his words: "... the incentive value of success is a positive linear function of difficulty as inferred from the subjective probability of success” (p. 371). The greater the Expectancy of success (E), the lesser the positive value of success (W), illustrating a negative relation between the two. Similarly, Commodity Theory (Brock, 1968) argues that scarcity enhances the value of commodities to be possessed. This notion has received consistent support in the marketing and consumer behavior literatures. Lynn (1991) offers a meta-analysis of empirical studies demonstrating the negative effects of abundance upon value, including research by Fromkin and Brock (1971), Lynn (1987), Szybillo (1973) and Worchel, Lee, and Adewole (1975). All of the aforementioned studies provide support for the notion that abundance (i.e., high Expectancy of attainment) decreases the perceived desirability of a commodity (hence lowering Want). ON MOTIVATIONAL READINESS 16 In summary then, there is plentiful evidence in the research literature attesting that the factors of Want and Expectancy are interdependent, although their exact manner of interdependence (that is, the presence of positive or negative W on E effects or vice versa) may vary across cases. Goal Formation The fundamental ingredients of MR, W and E, closely resemble the desirability and attainability factors associated with the goal construct (Kruglanski, 1996, p. 600). It is important, therefore, to elucidate the way in which motivational readiness and goal formation are related. We assume that the dimension of motivational readiness is partitioned into two basic regions: a pre-commitment region and a post-commitment region. Dividing them is the commitment point, beyond which motivational readiness morphs into a goal that the individual “owns.” Indeed, in everyday parlance, the goal concept implies commitment and ownership: “It is ‘your goal’, ‘my goal’, or ‘their goal,’” we commonly say, highlighting the possession aspect of goals. Similarly, Wikipedia defines a goal as “a desired result a person or a system envisions, plans, and commits to achieve” (italics added). Below the commitment point, one may consider an object or a state of affairs favorably, yet not so favorably as to commit oneself to its attainment. It is a level of motivational readiness that characterizes what Gollwitzer (1990) called the deliberation mindset, wherein the individual has not quite decided whether or not to commit to a given goal. Beyond the commitment point, however, increases in motivational readiness translate into degrees of goal magnitude. For instance, though one may be committed to both tooth brushing, and ensuring the health of one’s child health, the goal magnitudes in these two cases may be of different orders. 3 Elaboration of this is beyond the scope of the present manuscript. ON MOTIVATIONAL READINESS 17 The dual-threshold model of goal commitment. As discussed above, we assume that the same factors, W and E, albeit at different levels, determine the extent of motivational readiness in the preand post-commitment regions. Specifically, the commitment point is conceived of as combining two critical thresholds: the W threshold, and the E threshold. In other words, to morph into a goal, it is incumbent that motivational readiness be at or beyond a given level of W, but also at or beyond a given level of E. Let GM represent goal magnitude, Th (W) the threshold of Want, and Th (E), the threshold of Expectancy. We thus have: (2a) GM = g(MR), when MR≥ Th (MR) and E ≥ Th (E) (2b) GM = 0, when MR< Th (MR) or E < Th (E) For EQs (2a, 2b), we assume that g(MR) is a monotonic function, and both Th (E) > 0 and Th (MR) > 0. These notions are graphically represented in Figure 1 in which goal magnitude (GM) is graphed as a function of the two thresholds, namely Th (MR) and Th(E). Figure 1 here In this graph, GM is at a zero level, unless both the MR and the E are at above threshold levels. The commitment point thus defines a point at which both the MR and the E values are at their threshold levels exactly. Beyond the commitment point, GM varies monotonically as a function of MR (as determined by both its W and E components). Incentive By incentive we mean a feature of the psychological situation, an object or a state, relevant to the individual’s current Want. As discussed later, the incentive concept has played 4 Note that if MR is beyond threshold (e.g., because of a high value of W) but E is below threshold --no goal formation is assumed to occur (hence GM=0). 5 The same feature when consumed becomes a reward. In a sense then, incentives exert their effects on motivational readiness forward inducing their anticipation by the organism, whereas rewards affect it backward, appropriately affecting learning and memory. ON MOTIVATIONAL READINESS 18 an important role in classic models of motivation. Because our theory substantially differs from its predecessors in its treatment of incentives, it is well to examine this construct in some detail. To do so, we first discuss a key ingredient of incentive, referred to as perceived affordance. Perceived affordance. By perceived affordance (PA) we mean a perceived feature of the environment in which an individual is currently embedded. Almost any feature of the situation could be perceived as an affordance to some organisms in some circumstances: A pellet of food in the goal box, the sight of a restaurant, a car dealership, a lighthouse. Gibson (1979) defined affordance as follows: "[it is what] the environment ... offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes, for either good or ill ... It implies the complementarity of the animal and the environment” (p. 127). Affordance, to Gibson, is the environmentally suggested possibility of gratifying one’s need if such a need is present. A pellet of food (or a bunch of pellets) could satisfy an animal’s hunger, a restaurant--a diner’s gastronomic cravings, a car dealership--one’s need for transportation, and a lighthouse--guidance to a wandering seafarer. Whereas Gibsonian affordance is “objective,” residing as it does in the external environment, perceived affordance admits both an external informational input and an internal input of schemas, motivations, etc. So, whereas according to Gibson (1979): “The affordance of something does not change as the need of the observer changes” (pp. 138-139), within the present framework, perception of an affordance may be partially determined by the individual’s motivations. This may be especially so where the stimulus information is ambiguous (Dunning, 1999; Kunda, 1990) facilitating an interpretation of the situation as signaling the possibility of Want satisfaction. In a gist then, perceived affordances are part of the psychological situation (Lewin, 1951), that is, the environment as subjectively experienced by the individual. Accordingly, they may or ON MOTIVATIONAL READINESS 19 may not be “real.” A cake on a cafeteria counter might be real enough, as may the car on display at a dealership, or the food on the grocery-store counter. Other perceived affordances might be illusory: a fata morgana of a refreshing spring in a Sahara desert, an innocent smile taken as an invitation to romance, et cetera. Perceived affordances have the potential to affect the subject’s well-being “for either good or ill” (Gibson, 1979, p. 127). A perceived positive affordance is an environmental feature that a subject with a given need may find appealing, and a negative affordance one that he or she might find repulsive or threatening. Victory in an athletic contest, an alluring object at an art gallery, or a tasty meal at a gourmet restaurant may constitute positive affordances capable, when taken advantage of, of gratifying individuals’ competitive, aesthetic, and gastronomic needs. A threatened loss of a dear possession, the prospect of severe pain, or a risk of failure or humiliation are negative affordances, that is, aversive potentialities whose actualization people typically seek to avoid. The affordance vector. Like the Want states, perceived affordances possess a set of characteristics. A food may hold promise of providing a certain taste, texture, appearance, or quantity; a job may be perceived as promising a certain level of difficulty, prestige, pay, and responsibilities; a situation with a health risk may be characterized by the disease threatened, the likelihood of its contraction, etc. As with characteristics of the Want states, those of a given affordance may be conceptualized as a set of numbers, a numerical vector whose elements represent the dimensionality of that particular affordance, and its values on those dimensions. Incentive = Match. To impact motivational readiness, perceived affordances should ON MOTIVATIONAL READINESS 20 correspond to the individual’s momentary desires. This means that incentive value depends on the degree of agreement between perceived situational affordance and the individual’s Want. This point has been intuited well by past motivational researchers. Learning theorists implicitly assumed “that the goal object must be appropriate to the drive being manipulated; for example, food when animals are hungry, water when thirsty” (Weiner, 1972, p. 35). Atkinson (1964) explicitly stated: "Food has zero incentive value to a completely sated organism” (p. 283), and Lewin (1934) wrote that “the valence of environmental objects and the needs of the individual are correlative” (p. 78). Despite this awareness, however, the notion of correspondence between “valences” on one hand and “quasi needs” on the other (in Lewinian terminology) never found its way to various formal representations of motivational readiness; their explicit incorporation under the label of Match thus constitutes a distinctive feature of the present formulation. Assessing Match. As presently conceptualized, Match (M) denotes a degree of correspondence between the contents of the Want and those of the perceived affordance. This notion is graphically represented in Figure 2. The left side of the figure contains a cylinder-like structure sliced into several horizontal parts. This depiction is meant to correspond to the Want and its various features (W1, W2, etc.). The right hand of the figure contains a similar figure representing the perceived affordance with its own features (A1, A2, etc.). The links connecting 6 Not all perceived affordances fulfill that requirement. One could perceive that a situation affords a satisfaction of a given Want without experiencing that particular Want oneself, and in fact while experiencing a different Want. In research by Higgins, Idson, Freitas, Spiegel, and Molden (2003b), participants with a prevention orientation in conditions affording the satisfaction of a promotion motive (a chance of improving one’s outcome beyond the status quo), or participants with a promotion orientation in conditions affording the satisfaction of a prevention motive (a chance of avoiding a loss) perceived perfectly well the situational affordances (as attested by the appropriate manipulation checks) that did not correspond to these individuals’ specific Wants. ON MOTIVATIONAL READINESS 21 the Want and the affordance structures represent the degree of Match, from complete absence of Match, indicated by an absence of a link, through a weak correspondence, denoted by a segmented line, to a strong correspondence, represented by a thick line. Mathematically, the degree of Match may be represented by the index of dependability φ(Brenan & Kane, 1977; House, Dorfman, Javidan, Hanges, & Sully de Luque, 2014, p. 167) which values can range between 0 (representing a complete lack of Match) and 1.00 (representing a complete Match). Importantly, φ takes into account not only the degree of correlation between two sets of values (representing pattern matching) but also the match in their magnitudes, consistent with the present conceptual intent. Finally, φ assumes positive values where the situational affordances are positive, and negative values when they are negative. Figure 2 here In essence, the Match parameter expresses the degree to which it appears situationally possible for individuals to get what they Want, or to avoid that which they would rather eschew. We assume that Match contributes positively to motivational readiness. It captures what classical motivational theorists intended (without explicitly stating it) by the construct of incentive. For a positive perceived affordance, the extent of the contribution is a function of Match between what the individual wishes to attain and what seems available out there. For a negative affordance, the contribution is a function of the Match between what the individual wishes to avoid and the