Consequentialism, Metaphysical Realism, and the Argument from Clueless- ness†

The most powerful version of the classic epistemic argument against consequentialism is stated in an article by James Lenman. Lenman’s “argument from cluelessness” claims that a significant percentage of the consequences of our actions are wholly unknowable and hence, when it comes to assessing the moral quality of our actions, we are literally without a clue. In this paper, I distinguish the argument from cluelessness from traditional epistemic objections to consequentialism, and argue that the argument from cluelessness should be no more problematic for consequentialism than the argument from epistemological skepticism should be for metaphysical realism. I argue that this puts those who would reject consequentialism on grounds of cluelessness in an awkward philosophical position. The most powerful version of the classic epistemic argument against consequentialism is stated in an article by James Lenman.1 Lenman’s argument— henceforth known as the “argument from cluelessness”—claims that a significant percentage of the consequences of our actions are wholly unknowable and hence, when it comes to assessing the moral quality of our actions, we are literally without a clue. If we accept consequentialism, the moral valence of our actions is simply unknowable; if that is correct, it is difficult to see how the moral valence of actions and decisions could possibly play any meaningful role in human life. This argument is powerful. Indeed, I shan’t dispute the claim that many of the consequences of our actions are unknowable to us. The question I shall address is whether the fact of cluelessness should worry the advocate †Thanks to Aaron Garrett for inspiring my attention to this important issue. I would also like to dedicate this paper to the memory of my late colleague, A.C. (Tony) Genova, whose early encouragement led to its first complete draft. “Consequentialism and Cluelessness” in Philosophy and Public Affairs 29 (2000).