Robust approachability and regret minimization in games with partial monitoring
نویسندگان
چکیده
Approachability has become a standard tool in analyzing learning algorithms in the adversarial online learning setup. We develop a variant of approachability for games where there is ambiguity in the obtained reward that belongs to a set, rather than being a single vector. Using this variant we tackle the problem of approachability in games with partial monitoring and develop simple and efficient algorithms for this setup. We finally consider external and internal regret in repeated games with partial monitoring, for which we show efficient regret-minimizing strategies based on approachability theory.
منابع مشابه
Set-valued approachability and online learning with partial monitoring
Approachability has become a standard tool in analyzing learning algorithms in the adversarial online learning setup. We develop a variant of approachability for games where there is ambiguity in the obtained reward: it belongs to a set rather than being a single vector. Using this variant we tackle the problem of approachability in games with partial monitoring and develop a simple and general...
متن کاملResponse-Based Approachability and its Application to Generalized No-Regret Algorithms
Approachability theory, introduced by Blackwell (1956), provides fundamental results on repeated games with vector-valued payoffs, and has been usefully applied since in the theory of learning in games and to learning algorithms in the online adversarial setup. Given a repeated game with vector payoffs, a target set S is approachable by a certain player (the agent) if he can ensure that the ave...
متن کاملOnline Learning and Blackwell Approachability with Partial Monitoring: Optimal Convergence Rates
Blackwell approachability is an online learning setup generalizing the classical problem of regret minimization by allowing for instance multi-criteria optimization, global (online) optimization of a convex loss, or online linear optimization under some cumulative constraint. We consider partial monitoring where the decision maker does not necessarily observe the outcomes of his decision (unlik...
متن کاملBlackwell Approachability and No-Regret Learning are Equivalent
We consider the celebrated Blackwell Approachability Theorem for two-player games with vector payoffs. Blackwell himself previously showed that the theorem implies the existence of a “noregret” algorithm for a simple online learning problem. We show that this relationship is in fact much stronger, that Blackwell’s result is equivalent to, in a very strong sense, the problem of regret minimizati...
متن کاملRegret minimization in repeated matrix games with variable stage duration
Regret minimization in repeated matrix games has been extensively studied ever since Hannan’s (1957) seminal paper. Several classes of no-regret strategies now exist; such strategies secure a longterm average payoff as high as could be obtained by the fixed action that is best, in hindsight, against the observed action sequence of the opponent. We consider an extension of this framework to repe...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
عنوان ژورنال:
دوره شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2011