Pareto Stable Matchings under One-Sided Matroid Constraints
نویسندگان
چکیده
The Pareto stability is one of solution concepts in two-sided matching markets with ties. It is known that there always exists a Pareto stable matching in the many-to-many setting. In this paper, we consider the following generalization of the Pareto stable matching problem in the many-to-many setting. Each agent v of one side has a matroid defined on the set of edges incident to v, and the set of agents assigned to v must be an independent set of this matroid. By extending the algorithm of Kamiyama for the many-to-many setting, we prove that there always exists a Pareto stable matching in this setting, and a Pareto stable matching can be found in polynomial time.
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