Approval Voting for Committees: Threshold Approaches
نویسندگان
چکیده
When electing a committee from the pool of individual candidates, it is not sufficient to elicit voters preferences among individual candidates and one should also take into account voters’ opinions about synergetic effects of candidate interactions if they are jointly elected into a committee. We propose an approval voting method in which each voter selects a set of candidates indicating his or her approval of any committee that has sufficiently many candidates from the selected set. The committee approved by most voters is elected.
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