Arrow’s General Possibility Theorem
نویسنده
چکیده
3 Preliminaries 5 3.1 Rational Preference Relations (RPRs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.2 Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.3 Choice Sets, Choice Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.4 Social Choice Functions (SCFs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.5 Social Welfare Functions (SWFs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.6 General Properties of an SCF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.7 Decisiveness and Semi-decisiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
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