Equilibria of Greedy Combinatorial Auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
We consider auctions in which greedy algorithms, paired with first-price or criticalprice payment rules, are used to resolve multiparameter combinatorial allocation problems. We study the price of anarchy for social welfare in such auctions. We show, for a variety of equilibrium concepts, including Bayes–Nash equilibria, low-regret bidding sequences, and asynchronous bestresponse dynamics, that the resulting price of anarchy bound is close to the approximation factor of the underlying greedy algorithm.
منابع مشابه
A Equilibria of Greedy Combinatorial Auctions
We consider auctions in which greedy algorithms, paired with first-price or critical-price payment rules, are used to resolve multi-parameter combinatorial allocation problems. We study the price of anarchy for social welfare in such auctions. We show for a variety of equilibrium concepts, including Bayes-Nash equilibrium, low-regret bidding sequences, and asynchronous best-response dynamics, t...
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- SIAM J. Comput.
دوره 46 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2017