Room assignment-rent division: A market approach

نویسندگان

  • Atila Abdulkadiroglu
  • Tayfun Sönmez
  • M. Utku Ünver
چکیده

A group of friends consider renting a house but they shall first agree on how to allocate its rooms and share the rent. We propose an auction mechanism for room assignment-rent division problems which mimics the market mechanism. Our auction mechanism is efficient, envy-free, individually-rational and it yields a non-negative price to each room whenever that is possible with envy-freeness.

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عنوان ژورنال:
  • Social Choice and Welfare

دوره 22  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2004