Title: Malaria and Preventive Behaviors: Is There a Malaria Trap?

This study proposes to rethink malaria economic analysis by combining economic epidemiology tools with the poverty trap literature. The endogeneity of malaria with respect to households and individuals socioeconomic characteristics and choices remains a particularly relevant and unresolved issue. In spite of massive efforts to generalize efficient prevention (such as ITNs), malaria remains prevalent in many countries. We design a theoretical model of rational preventive behaviors in response to the disease, which includes endogenous externalities and disease characteristics. Two important conclusions emerge from the model. First, agents increase their preventive behaviors when the degree of prevalence of malaria in a society is more severe. This result is consistent with the literature on "prevalenceelastic behavior". Second we find that multiple equilibria are theoretically possible and so is the existence of malaria traps, defined as any self-reinforcing mechanism, which causes malaria to persist. An implication discussed in this paper concerns public policies and possible mechanisms to get out of the trap.