Ascending Prices and Package Bidding: An Experimental Analysis
نویسندگان
چکیده
We use theory and experiment to explore the effectiveness of price-guided mechanisms to assign resources in package allocation problems. Two mechanisms are tested: the combinatorial clock auction (CCA) of Porter, Rassenti, Roopnarine, and Smith (2003) and a matched version of the simultaneous ascending auction (SAA), similar to designs currently in use for spectrum and electricity sales. Unlike earlier experiments, we report not only comparative efficiency and revenue but also statistics about bidder behavior. In our experiments, the CCA fails to achieve core outcomes (efficient and entailing competitive revenues) except in special environments where a particular search algorithm happens to find efficient allocations.
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We use theory and experiment to explore the effectiveness of price-guided mechanisms to assign resources in package allocation problems. Two mechanisms are tested: the combinatorial clock auction (CCA) of Porter, Rassenti, Roopnarine, and Smith (2003) and a matched version of the simultaneous ascending auction (SAA), similar to designs currently in use for spectrum and electricity sales. Unlike...
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