Non-Archimedean Subjective Probabilities in Decision Theory and Games
نویسنده
چکیده
To allow conditioning on counterfactual events, zero probabilities can be replaced by infinitesimal probabilities that range over a non-Archimedean ordered field. This paper considers a suitable minimal field that is a complete metric space. Axioms similar to those in Anscombe and Aumann (1963) and in Blume, Brandenburger and Dekel (1991) are used to characterize preferences which: (i) reveal unique nonArchimedean subjective probabilities within the field; and (ii) can be represented by the non-Archimedean subjective expected value of any real-valued von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function in a unique cardinal equivalence class, using the natural ordering of the field.
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