S . Delaune , P . Lafourcade , D . Lugiez , R . Treinen Symbolic Protocol Analysis in Presence of a Homomorphism Operator and Exclusive Or Research Report LSV - 05 - 20 November 2005
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چکیده
The symbolic verification of the security property of a cryptographic protocol for a bounded number of sessions is usually expressed as a symbolic trace reachability problem. Such a problem can be expressed as a constraint system for deducibility constraints for a certain inference system describing the possible actions of an attacker. We show that symbolic trace reachability for well-defined protocols is decidable in presence of both the exclusive or operator and a homomorphism over this operator. The exclusive or operator is often used in security protocols as a symmetric encryption operation. The homomorphism may model a hash function, or may be used to model a special situation in asymmetric encryption where an intruder may encrypt a message but can never learn about the corresponding decryption key. One main step of our proof consists in reducing the constraint system for deducibility into a constraint system for deducibility in one step and using one particular rule of the constraint system. This constraint system, in turn, can be expressed as a system of quadratic equations of a particular form over the ring of polynomials in one indeterminate over the finite field Z/2Z[h]. We show that satisfiability of these systems of equations is decidable.
منابع مشابه
Symbolic Protocol Analysis in Presence of a Homomorphism Operator and Exclusive Or
Security of a cryptographic protocol for a bounded number of sessions is usually expressed as a symbolic trace reachability problem. We show that symbolic trace reachability for well-defined protocols is decidable in presence of the exclusive or theory in combination with the homomorphism axiom. These theories allow us to model basic properties of important cryptographic operators. This trace r...
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