On Equilibria in Duopolies with Finite Strategy Spaces

نویسنده

  • Kalyan Talluri
چکیده

We will call a game a reachable (pure strategy) equilibria game if starting from any strategy by any player, by a sequence of best-response moves we are able to reach a (pure strategy) equilibrium. We give a characterization of all ̄nite strategy space duopolies with reachable equilibria. We describe some applications of the su±cient conditions of the characterization. ¤Kalyan Talluri, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27, 08005 Barcelona, Spain, email: [email protected]

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تاریخ انتشار 2003