Feminist Disagreement (comparatively) Recast

Critical issues of gender justice are frequently analyzed in the American legal academy without meaningful attention to the insights of newer feminist theories. To some degree this is understandable, as newer feminisms have added substantially to the overall complexity of feminist scholarship and have employed a less accessible argumentative style than older feminist theories. Selective “tuning out” of this kind also has real costs, as it tends to lead legal actors to systematically overestimate the likely benefits of legal change aimed at achieving gender justice. This Article seeks to re-explain the insights of more recent feminist theories to broader legal actors, in ways that connect them to the insights of older feminist theories. To do this, the Article looks to comparative constitutional case law for guidance. It identifies three understandings of gender justice in this context, which it labels “disruptive,” “ameliorative,” and “transformative.” It then shows how more recent feminist theories can be re-explained in terms of these concepts, in ways that make them more intelligible within existing understandings in the legal academy.