Bargaining over multiple issues with maximin and leximin preferences
نویسندگان
چکیده
Global bargaining problems over a finite number of different issues are formalized as cartesian products of classical bargaining problems. For maximin and leximin bargainers we characterize global bargaining solutions that are efficient and satisfy the requirement that bargaining separately or globally leads to equivalent outcomes. Global solutions in this class are constructed from the family of monotone path solutions for classical bargaining problems.
منابع مشابه
Truncated Leximin solutions
This paper shows that three classic properties for bargaining solutions in an environment with a variable number of agents – Anonymity, Individual Monotonicity and Consistency – characterize a one-parameter class of Truncated Leximin solutions. Given a positive and possibly infinite α, a Truncated Leximin solution gives each agent the minimum of α and their Leximin solution payoff. JEL-Classifi...
متن کاملMulti-issue Bargaining with Endogenous Agenda
The first part of this paper shows that in a noncooperative bargaining model with alternating offers and time preferences the timing of issues (the agenda) matters even if players become arbitrarily patient. This result raises the question of which agenda should come up endogenously when agents bargain over a set of unrelated issues. It is found that simultaneous bargaining over “packages” shou...
متن کاملProportional Concessions and the Leximin Solution
In this article we introduce a new axiom for bargaining solutions, named Proportional Concession Monotonicity (PCM), which imposes that no player benefit when all players collectively make proportional concessions with respect to their respective utopia values. We reconsider the leximin solution (Imai, 1983), and obtain an alternative characterization on the basis of PCM. JEL-Classification: C78
متن کاملLeximin Multiple Objective DCOPs on Factor Graphs for Preferences of Agents
Distributed Constraint Optimization Problem (DCOP) has been studied as a fundamental component of multiagent systems. With DCOPs, various applications on multiagent systems are formalized as constraint optimization problems where variables and functions are distributed among agents. Leximin AMODCOP has been proposed as a class of Multiple Objective DCOPs, where multiple objectives for individua...
متن کاملMoral Implications of Rational Choice Theories
Rational choice theories assert that human beings behave rationally, either in the narrow sense of rational self-interest, or in the broader sense that decisions are rationally based on preferences. These empirical theories make no direct ethical claims, but they may have relevance to ethics. Social contract theorists have maintained, for example, that rational individuals can assent to a socia...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
عنوان ژورنال:
- Social Choice and Welfare
دوره 30 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2008