Bidding Behavior in Multi-Unit Auctions — An Experimental Investigation and some Theoretical Insights¤
نویسندگان
چکیده
We present laboratory experiments of ...ve di¤erent multi-unit auction mechanisms. Two units of a homogeneous object were auctioned o¤ among two bidders with ‡at demand for two units. We test whether expected demand reduction occurs in open and sealed–bid uniform–price auctions. Revenue equivalence is tested for these auctions as well as for the Ausubel, the Vickrey and the discriminatory sealed–bid auction. Furthermore, we compare the ...ve mechanisms with respect to the e¢cient allocation of the units. We also provide some theoretical insights concerning the equilibria of uniform–price auctions with incomplete information. JEL classi...cation: D44, C91
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تاریخ انتشار 2003