n-player bargaining based on preference intensity
نویسنده
چکیده
Lee, Hyeon-soo, "n-player bargaining based on preference intensity " (1994). Retrospective Theses and Dissertations. Paper 11283. This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from aiQ^ type of computer printer. The qnality of this reprodnction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photogr^hs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and inq)roper alignment can adversely affect reproduction. In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back of the book. Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for ai^ photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.
منابع مشابه
Information collection in bargaining
I analyze a bilateral bargaining model with one-sided uncertainty about time preferences. The uninformed player has the option of halting the bargaining process to obtain additional information, when it is his turn to offer. In general, the uninformed player does not collect information when he is quite sure about his opponent’s type. I identify preference settings in which the uninformed playe...
متن کاملTransfer of Bargaining Power Sources in Oil Trade Games
Bargaining Power is one of the important issues in oil trade negotiations. In this paper two effective factors in bargaining power i.e. patient time to deal and outside options of each player have been considered. The necessary relations for exchange of sources in negotiation have been derived.
متن کاملOne-to-Many Bargaining with Endogenous Protocol
This paper studies the bargaining between one central player and N peripheral players. In each period the central player chooses which peripheral player to bargain with, hence the bargaining protocol is endogenously determined. The peripheral players are heterogeneous in terms of their bargaining power. We characterize the set of equilibrium outcomes with two different types of contracts, namel...
متن کاملOn Equilibria of N-seller and N-buyer Bargaining Games
A group of players which contain n sellers and n buyers bargain over the partitions of n pies. A seller (/buyer) has to reach an agreement with a buyer (/seller) on the division of a pie. The players bargain in a system like the stock market: each seller(buyer) can either offer a selling(buying) price to all buyers(sellers) or accept a price offered by another buyer(seller). The offered prices ...
متن کاملIntegration of Bargaining into E-Business Systems
Despite the fact that bargaining plays an important role in business communications, it is largely neglected in e-business systems. In this paper a conceptual model that integrates bargaining into web-based e-business systems will be developed starting from an informal characterisation of the bargaining process. Bargaining can be formalised as a two-player game, and integrated with the co-desig...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
عنوان ژورنال:
دوره شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2015