Project Contracting Strategies for Managing Team Dynamics
نویسندگان
چکیده
In this chapter we study a team dynamic problem in which a group of agents collaborate over time to complete a project. The project progresses at a rate that depends on the agents’ e↵orts, and it generates a payo↵ upon completion. First, we show that agents work harder the closer the project is to completion, and members of a larger team work harder than members of a smaller team both individually and on aggregate if and only if the project is su ciently far from completion. Second, we analyze the problem faced by a manager who is the residual claimant of the project and she chooses the size of the team and the agents’ incentive contracts to maximize her discounted payo↵. We show that the optimal symmetric contract compensates the agents only upon completion of the project. Finally, we endogenize the size of the project, where a bigger project is one that requires greater cumulative e↵ort and generates a larger upon upon completion. We show that if the manager can commit to her optimal project size at the outset of the game, then she will choose a smaller project relative to the case without commitment. An implication of this result is that without commitment, the manager is better o↵ delegating the decision rights over the project size to the agents.
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تاریخ انتشار 2016