Absence of Pure Nash Equilibria in a class of Co-ordination Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
We prove that for a certain class of co-ordination games with increasing payoffs for co-ordination there are not necessarily pure Nash equilibria. This is achieved by introducing a particular model for the payoffs. This result is in contrast to the congestion game with decreasing payoff. We discuss a generalization of the model introduced which is of independent interest.
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