Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: An update

A group of agents have claims on a resource, but there is not enough of it to honor all of the claims. How should it be divided? A group of agents decide to undertake a public project that they can jointly afford. How much should each of them contribute? This essay is an update of Thomson (2003), a survey of the literature devoted to the study of such problems. JEL classification number: C79; D63; D74 Key-words: claims problems; constrained equal awards rule; constrained equal losses rule; proportional rule; axiomatic approach; game-theoretic approach. ∗I thank Siwei Chen and Youngsub Chun for their comments. I am particularly indebted to Patrick Harless, Yoichi Kasajima, Özgür Kıbrıs, Juan Moreno-Ternero, and a referee for their very detailed suggestions. updatedsurvey8.tex