Loans to Japanese Borrowers
نویسنده
چکیده
*The ideas expressed here do not represent the opinions of the Board of Governors of the Federal System, or its staff. Part of this project was developed, and much of the early data collected, with Mikari Kashima at the Bank of Japan.
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