The Media and the Law and Order Myth in American Political Discourse

A significant topic in American political discourse is that of law and order. Politicians, civic leaders, and policy makers often propose a hard-line towards crime so that “law and order” is maintained. In this essay, I contend that the discourse of “law and order” has taken on mythic properties in American political discourse, and that the media, in large part, has contributed to the creation of a “law and order” myth. The “law and order” rhetoric of J. Edgar Hoover, Estes Kaufaver, George C. Wallace, and Richard Nixon all have been greatly aided by a media presence that extends the topic of “law and order” beyond the realm of political discourse and into the realm of political myth. This essay discusses the influence of Hoover, Kefauver’s, Wallace’s, and Nixon’s “law and order” rhetoric, and points out the media coverage, in each of these cases, aided in creating a powerful cultural and political “law and order” myth. Introduction Crime in America has at its foundation, a “law and order” myth that warrants strategic political action. Public officials, policy makers, law enforcement officials, political candidates, and civic leaders all address the issue of crime in American society as a way to promote their political clout (if not for purposes of capturing a vote) (Trent & Friedenberg, 1991). Such political responses to crime are necessary because public opinion demand that those in leadership roles protect “law and order” (Pepinsky & Jesilow, 1984, O’Keefe, 1985, O’Keefe & Reid-Nash, 1987). Thus, the prominence of crime in American public discourse is due, in large part, to the various rhetorical functions generated by a “law and order” cultural myth. As a mythic symbol, “law and order” tells a story that includes both ideological and mythic representations of society. As the story of crime in America has evolved and changed, so too has the influence of “law and order” on different contexts. Among these “law and order” contexts are the images associated with organized crime, protests, demonstrations, riots, and, of course, street crime. Each of these contexts are personified in American culture by popular crimefighters and gangsters such as J. Edgar Hoover and Al Capone; while the conservative personae of President Richard Nixon and Senator George C. Wallace demonstrate intolerance for war and civil rights protesters. Additionally, street crime is one of the most significant contexts addressed by the media’s touting of “law and order.” Mediated images of “diseased” streets Mark Meister, Ph.D., is an assistant professor of in the Department of Communication, North Dakota State University, Fargo, ND 58105. The author wishes to thank Dr. Ron Lee for his helpful comments during the development of this essay. Speaker and Gavel, Vol. 36 (1999), 1-18 2 SPEAKER AND GAVEL 1999 littered with crime and filth are captured in innumerable television dramas, tabloid and talk shows, and documentaries. Often the images of street crime and violence are mediated messages that reinforce the need for, if not the lack of, law and order. The NBC television series titled Law and Order, for example, tells the “reallife” stories of the crime investigators and prosecutors in New York City, while ABC’s NYPD Blue focuses on the tragedies experienced by those directly involved with street crime. Among the assumptions representing “law and order” in these and other contexts is one that is potentially discriminatory. The assumptions in many of these mediated programs is that those who disturb the peace and interrupt the social order are generally members of ethnic and minority groups who must be punished in order to re-establish social order (Pepinsky & Jesilow, 1984). In this essay, I critically evaluate the mediated manifestations and contexts of “law and order” and how they potentially contribute to the often discriminatory nature of the American criminal justice system. I contend that the creation and evolution of the “law and order” has at its foundation the television and film coverage directed at Federal Bureau of Investigation director J. Edgar Hoover during the 1930s, and 1951 senator and Crime Committee Chairman Estes Kefauver. To illustrate this influence, I will discuss how the “law and order” myth takes shape as its focus is transformed from fighting organized crime (Hoover and Kefauver’s influence of the 1930s and 1950s) to street crime. U.S. Presidential candidate and senator, George C. Wallace, and President Richard Nixon both demonstrated intolerance for the street crimes associated with anti-war protests and civil rights demonstration. Although there are many other examples in American history of bold crimefighters, arguably Hoover, Kefauver, Wallace, and Nixon represent those whose crime rhetoric was highly mediated. Hoover’s glorified “G-Man” image, Kefauver’s widely watched televised crime hearings, Wallace’s cankerous positions on crime during his presidential campaign, and Nixon’s intolerance for crime both as a presidential candidate and as president were highly visible precisely because Americans watched “law and order” take shape. The “law and order” myth, I contend, did not evolve and shape American ideals because of policy or legislative warrants about crime. Rather, “law and order” evolved into a mythic rhetorical manifestation because of the highly mediated and visual “anti-crime” images that Hoover, Kefauver, Wallace, and Nixon communicated and that the media happily broadcasted. In the examples of Hoover, Kefauver, Wallace, and Nixon, we witness how the media embraced law and order as a significant cultural issue, and glorified or vilified those associated with it. Aiding my analysis of the American “law and order” myth is the provocative notion of the “rhetoric of other” as discussed by critical discourse analysist Stephen Harold Riggins (1997). According to Riggins (1997), critical discourse analysists are “more interested in dissecting texts than in theorizing about the interpretive practices of readers and listeners” (p. 3). A text, in this vein, is not only limited to the realm of spoken or written discourse explicitly, but can include the symbolic constructions that permeate spoken and written discourse in implicit ways. One such manifestation of implicit dynamic is the symbolic force prescribed to cultural myth. Cultural myth becomes part of the ingrained consciousness of a culture beSPEAKER AND GAVEL 1999 3 cause it is reinforced both discursively and non-discursively. I am interested in critically analyzing the cultural myth of “law and order” as I see it created by Hoover, Kefauver, Wallace, and Nixon and reinforced and maintained by the media. Thus, the “rhetoric of othering” is of particular interest to those interested in the critical discourse analysis of cultural and political myth (Riggins, 1997). Many rhetorical critics engage the “other” construct in their scholarship (Berkowitz, 1997; Engnell, 1993; Gaonkar, 1993; Hasian, 1994; McKerrow, 1989). The term Other, as a rhetorical construct, can be traced back to the Plato, who used it to represent the relationship between an observer (the Self) and an observed (the Other) (Riggins, 1997). Presently in rhetorical scholarship, the Other refers to all people the Self perceives as mildly or radically different. McKerrow (1989) discusses “othering” in his notion of critical rhetoric that seeks to “unmask or demystify the discourse of power. The aim is to understand the integration of power/knowledge in society—what possibilities for change the integration invites or inhibits and what intervention strategies might be considered appropriate o effect social change” (p. 91). Basically, there are two aspects of the Other that facilitate its tendency to define peoples in terms of dominance and submissiveness. First, Riggins (1997) points out that language reveals boundaries that separate the Self and Other. Othering happens because languages are bound by grammatical rules and standards that include “inclusive and exclusive pronouns and possessives such as we and they, us and them, and ours and theirs” (Riggins, 1997). For example, Carbo’s (1997) analysis of political discourse in Mexico shows that an elite speaker’s claim to believe in inclusiveness may be undermined by contradictions between words and syntax. A close reading of political speeches in Mexico reveals that the identity of “we” fluctuates depending on the particular rhetorical point the speaker or writer is trying to make. The term “we” may refer in on sentence to the whole Mexican population, both aboriginal and European, whereas in another sentence the aboriginal population may be implicitly excluded (Carbo, 1997). Second, the Other is evidenced by the repetitious and contradictory nature of stereotypes (Riggins, 1997). Stereotypes are fantasies, “a substitute and a shadow” of the Other (Bhabha, 1994, p. 82), and ensure that differences between people are recognized. Through stereotypes, the Self expresses ambivalence toward Others, expressing not just derision but derision with desire (Riggins, 1997). For example, Jan Mohamed (1985) believes that the perception of difference is influenced by economic and political motives. Because the functioning of Othering is exploitation, the political and economic consequences contribute to a rhetoric of Othering that dehumanizes and diminishes groups. Because of our dependence on the media for the formation of perceptions concerning crime, the term “law and order” has come to have many connotations. Symbolically, “law and order” represent a “straight-line”—a line, when crossed, exemplifies disorder and chaos. Laws are implemented to perpetuate order, and function to gauge appropriate actions from those considered inappropriate. Part of the problems associated with the “law and order” myth are a result of how American culture gauges appropriate actions from those actions generally associated with the “other.” The “eye-for-an-eye” assumption that is used for the basis of 4 SPEAKER AND GAVEL 1999 punishment for crime is generally associated with length of incarceration. As French Philosopher Michel Foucault (1975) has pointed out: “[w]hat a remarkable achievement it has been for Americans to decide that harm can be measured in days, months, and years” (p. 36). In this way, the criminal justice system has come to equate law and order with social order—distinguishing the “other” from the law abiding society. The system assumes that unless a strong governmental agency uses law enforcement to control the citizenry into line, the citizens will carry out a war among themselves. It is this chaos that laws are intended to prevent. Law and order is intended to reduce uncertainty and to reduce confusion, thus insuring the comfort and stability associated with “peace.” With law, one assumes that order will follow, and that peace is insured, and that those potential threats for the “other” will be stopped. Laws become policies guaranteeing the maintenance of social order by distinguishing the “other” from the lawful. If the phrase “law and order” is rearranged to read “order and law,” the assumption is that a virtuous time existed where no law was needed. No laws were needed because peace was firmly established. Various forms of hierarchical systems that insured order and maintained a peaceful environment dominated social, public, and political order. What becomes apparent is that the phrase “law and order” is a response to the violent incidents that have displaced “peace” and order. In essence, the law and order myth discriminates because the images of crime, as portrayed by the media, are of those who do not necessarily “fit the order.” The assumption is that society has become diseased through the actions of “others.” Television screens light-up with images of the whacked-out drug addict stealing and killing for money to buy his next fix. “Real world” crime television shows like Top Cops and Rescue 911 reinforce the images of discrimination, because the focus of these shows is on breaking-up crimes generally committed by young, black men who are part of a corrupt society. According to Pepinsky and Jesilow (1984) television illustrates the poor as breeders of violence and corruption because they do not have the resources to protect themselves against eventual prosecution. Where the rich have these protections against prosecution, Pepinsky and Jesilow contend that “the poor are less likely to get out of jail before trial, more likely to get convicted, and more likely to be imprisoned if convicted” (p. 15) which reinforces both that crime is committed by the poor, and that the criminal justice system of authority is inherently discriminatory. “Equity,” according to Pepinsky and Jesilow, “would require that almost all police resources be needed to look for crime in the business suites rather than crime in the streets” (p. 15). A persistent myth throughout history that perpetuates itself in society after society is that a populace can be forced to behave as those in authority seem fit. In instances of violent crime, the same myth exists—that people can be made to behave the way a superior armed authority would have them behave (Pepinsky & Jesilow, 1984). Inherent within the “law and order” myth and demonstrated throughout history by Hoover, Kefauver, Wallace, and Nixon, for example, is the notion that those in authority must react with force in order to stop isolated instances of crime. But because the citizenry accepts the myth that minority groups who inhabit the inner-city perpetuate crime, the once virtuous community has been transformed into one that further distinguishes between “us” and the “other.” SPEAKER AND GAVEL 1999 5 The influence of the media and the dissemination of images associated with a corrupt society are part of a culture whose perceptions about crime are formed by the media. Television projects two contradictory images that flood the airways concerning street crime. The first image illustrates those in authority as strong, powerful, and intolerant “tough cops” who fight street crime generally started by minorities. The second image reinforces the discriminatory nature of the criminal justice system because television illustrates criminals as morally corrupt minority groups who resort to street crime in order to buy or sell drugs. The amount of time allotted by television in the coverage of crime both in programming and newscasts suggest that street crime is a rampant and uncontrollable force in society. The Law and Order Myth In his book Mythologies, Roland Barthes (1988) contends that a myth “hides nothing and flaunts nothing: it distorts; myth is neither a lie nor a confession: it is an inflexion “ (p. 129). Stated metaphorically, “myth illuminates and projects a light in the darkness of reality and the haze of misperception over the glow of truth” (London & Weeks, 1981, p. 17). “American values” are very much supported by myth (Edelman, 1988, Rushing, 1986). This myth is influential in the reinforcement of an American value system because it illustrates a relationship between politics and virtue (Dorsey, 1997). The virtuous citizen exemplifies American values because they support the notion of “law and order.” This representation of virtue illustrates the emotive influence that myths have on perception, and ultimately, cultural formation. Myths provide legitimacy to a culture because the stories they tell are timeless “lessons” which serve as emotive forces for maintaining social order (Osborn, 1990, Hart, 1990, Hocker Rushing, 1990, Rowland, 1990, Solomon, 1990). Like myths, ideologies are “capable of binding people together, not through a set of immutable truths, but through references to historical and political events, and appeals to a material orientation of the world” (Bass & Cherwitz, 1978, p. 215). Ideologies are a collection of beliefs, but where myths attempt to transcend social divisions, ideologies express the interests of the dominant group that provides plausible interpretations of political realities (Bass & Cherwitz, 1978, Lucaites & Condit, 1990). McGee (1980) calls these references “ideographs” and purports that “[t]he significance is in their concrete history as usages, not in alleged ideacontent” (p. 10). In order for myths to evolve, the expectations and demands of historical (traditional) audiences must be met (O’Leary & McFarland, 1989). The joining of mythic and ideological elements does not take place spontaneously. According to Ellul (1973) “myth and ideology wed via a complicated mixture of ideas and sentiments which entails the grafting of irrational onto the political and economic” (p. 31). Kenneth Burke (1989) notes that “ideology is to myth as rhetoric is to poetry,” (p. 303) since, “ideology, like rhetoric, gravitates to the side of ideas, and myth, like poetry gravitates to the side of image (p. 303). The result of this fusion of myth and ideology becomes a political myth because it entails both cognitive and emotive appeals that greatly impacts various aspects of culture (Hart, 1990, Lucaites & Condit, 1990). Barthes (1988) comments on the power and expansiveness of myth in reinforcing the image of the virtuous culture: 6 SPEAKER AND GAVEL 1999 “all aspects of the law, of morality, of aesthetics, of diplomacy, of household equipment, of Literature, of entertainment” (p. 148) are related to myth. The joining of myth as a cultural and political force, and ideology as a logical expression of these forces, creates a political myth that may rhetorically support the American manifestation of “law and order.” For example, the uniquely American story of the strong-willed and virtuous western sheriff who protects his town and its citizens from harm is a popular American narrative and exemplifies the prominence of the “law and order” myth in American culture. Here the sheriff-hero character protects the community from the outside lawlessness that infiltrates the culture from an untamed wilderness. The sheriff protects the community from exterior dangers that penetrate the inherent interior virtues of the moral small town. The “law and order” myth functions rhetorically because it recalls a virtuous, yet mythical time, when crime did not exist and social order was not threatened. As Dorsey (1997) argues, myths often do not represent reality and they generally have a violent and evil counter-part that threatens the virtuous core. Dorsey (1997) contends: “[m]ythic stories depict an ancient, dream-like, uncharted, and many times, dangerous universe with which the hero must then violently contend” (p. 453). The story of the small town, for example, with its pleasant images of “Main Street,” church steeples, and afternoon barbecues, tends to reinforce the notion that social order is paramount in the creation of American values (Lee, 1993). Yet, as the myth evolves, the virtuous small town often faces the threat of an evil outsider who manipulatively infiltrates and corrupts the virtuous core of the community. The “strength” and “character” of the small town citizen lies in her willingness to fight for what is virtuous. Here the virtuous citizen combats intended evil with a clear and well-intentioned conscious. Thus, the small town survives because of the fortitude of its citizens. In sum, an effective political myth includes those qualities that have emotive connotations (virtue vs. evil), while its ideological qualities recall a unrealistic time when “law and order” literally was not threatened. The influence of the “law and order” myth in the American value system is expressed through cultural symbols (London & Weeks, 1981) and evolves as the political ideologies associated with the myth recall emotive and logical instances. Thus, the presence of a “law and order” myth in the American value system narrative becomes an element of a larger, master story supporting the cultural myth of American values. I argue that during the 1930s, the “law and order” myth reinforced the American value system through television and film coverage that glamorized the “mythic” figures associated with crime and law enforcement (with specific reference to J. Edgar Hoover). Later, during the 1950s, this glamorization is replaced by Senator Estes Kefauver’s fight against a “corrupt insider” who threatened the virtues associated with the American system of law and order. Finally, the political discourse of George Wallace and Richard Nixon illustrates a vilification, whereby the law breaker is the immoral and corrupt “other.” Law and Order: Glamour and Corrupt Core The media and its impacts on the formation of public opinion about crime is often reflected in public perceptions concerning the causes and fear of crime SPEAKER AND GAVEL 1999 7 (Pritchard, 1994, Sherizen, 1978). Since the majority of people have little direct experience with crime (and especially its causes), it seems reasonable to assume that public perceptions of crime are, to some degree, formed on the basis of information received from media presentations (McQuail, 1994. Page, Shapiro, & Dempsey, 1994). Stroman and Seltzer (1985) suggest that mediated crime messages help fuel perceptions of crime by arguing that the mass media is a primary source of information about crime, that the media provides details about crimes which enable users to discuss the causes of crime and solutions to the crime problem, and that crime, in comparison to other topics, is a well-covered topic. Additionally, governmental agencies concerned with the proliferation of violent crime on American streets have established crime prevention programs which advise parents to limit the amount of violent programming children watch on television (O’Keefe, 1985). Arguably, the perceptions of crime by the people who watch television frequently are more likely to express a generalized fear of crime than those who watch less frequently (Stroman & Seltzer, 1985). Because the media, particularly television, has a profound impact on perception formation, the “law and order” myth of crime is fueled, reinforced, and solidified within the American culture’s psyche. Of specific interest here is the J. Edgar Hoover “G-Man” image portrayed in popular films during the 1930s and 1940s. These films helped symbolize an intolerance for organized crime, yet they also glamorized both the criminals associated with organized crime and crime fighters intent on stopping it. Crime fighters during the 1930s in pursued the likes of “Greasy Thumb” Guzik, Rocco Fischetti, “Scareface” Al, and “Tough Tony” Capezio, all of whom enjoyed significant popularity because the media aided in the promotion of these characters as cultural icons. Later, the gangsters, hooligans, and convicts investigated by Crime Committee Chairman Senator Estes Kefauver in 1951 were no longer glamorous because these criminals were corrupt law enforcement and justice officials. The “notoriety” and popularity of “Scarface” Al, or Rocco Fischetti no longer warranted media attention during the 1951 Crime Committee Hearings. Instead the media focused on the corruption that existed within the once virtuous community. During the 1920s and 1930s prohibition made otherwise lawabiding citizens into racketeering law-breakers. Breaking the law by consuming, distributing, and selling alcohol became a national pastime (Kefauver, 1968). What had began as simple bootlegging organized itself into powerful gangs which associated themselves with gambling, robbery, prostitution, and dope peddling (de Toledano, 1973). What was needed to stop the crime movement was “a symbol of law and order that could dish it out to the underworld exactly as they dished it out—only better. An individual who could toss the hot iron right back at them along with a smash in the jaw thrown in for good measure” (Powers, 1987, p. 22). This individual was FBI director J. Edgar Hoover. The Federal Bureau of Investigation of the 1930s was one of the New Deal’s political triumphs and J. Edgar Hoover was one of President Franklin Roosevelt’s most valuable and trusted lieutenants (Powers, 1987). The New York Times described the FBI under Hoover as “one of the government’s formidable crusaders against crime,” and claimed that “law-breakers of high and low estate have come to have a wholesome respect for the Bureau” (Powers, 1987, p. 48). Prior to Hoover’s 8 SPEAKER AND GAVEL 1999 leadership of the FBI, no hero of the law existed that was charismatic and powerful enough to counterbalance the anarchic power, defiance, and popularity of the criminal. Al Capone’s gang in Chicago, for example, was estimated at more than a quarter of a million dollars, and as a result of Capone’s charismatic and certainly his financial prowess, he became a cultural enigma of corruption and wealth. Films showed an America in which the underworld had overpowered legitimate society, and exposed its protectors as incompetent (Powers, 1987). Movies featured gangster heroes modeled after celebrity criminals like Capone as illustrated by the 1931 movie Public Enemy starring James Cagney. Fifty other movies were released in 1931 that seemed to follow an amoral “crime without punishment” formula. The challenge to the legitimacy of traditional authorities, as illustrated by a cycle of money-making prison pictures with sensational titles like The Big House (1930), Convict’s Code (1930), and Ladies of the Big House (1931), symbolically portrayed criminal gangsters who laughed in the face of law and order authorities. As director of the FBI during the 1930s, Hoover wielded a power that also grew from an incredible popularity during a decade that seemed fascinated with the celebrity and hero. Hoover, himself, became a popular and glamorous symbol of law and order for his fearless work against organized crime. The Lindbergh case and the man-hunt illustrated Hoover’s “tough” attitude toward organized crime for car thief and cop killer Martin James Durbin. These cases projected the FBI and Hoover onto the national stage, and for the first time, gangsters became fearful of law enforcement officers. Newspapers sensationalized the kidnapping of Charles A. Lindbergh’s son from his crib by organized gang members, and the pursuit of Durbin through Illinois, California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas. Hoover recounts one such sensational instance: Back in September of 1933, a group of special agents surrounded a house in Memphis where George ‘Machine Gun’ Kelly was hiding out. For two months the FBI had been trailing this gangster and his wife. As the FBI agents and local police surrounded the house and entered, one of them called out, ‘We are Federal officers. Come out with your hands up.’ ‘Machine Gun’ Kelly’s hands were trembling as he reached for the ceiling he screamed, ‘Don’t shoot G-Men, don’t shoot. (de Toledano, 1973) The “G-Man” abbreviation for “Government Man” became a symbol for the renewed law and order emphasis that Hoover brought to the FBI. This “G-Man” character resembles the sheriff-hero character associated with the American western myth. In the “G-Man” manifestation of the American western myth, the hero is a bureaucrat who provides safety for the virtuous community from the gangsters who try to infiltrate the culture. Hoover took pride in the fearsome reputation that the FBI had among members of the “outside” underworld. This reputation again caught the attention of popular entertainment. The movie G-Men had marked the beginning of a new era for Hoover. Hollywood aided in creating the G-Man myth and Hoover fueled this glamorization by creating an agency strong on regulations and low in tolerance (Theoharis & Cox, 1988). The social forces that once challenged the legitimacy of law enforcement later coalesced into the myth of the GMan projected a renewed interest in the maintenance of law and order. The popular fascination with rituals of crime and punishment, an interpretation of crime as SPEAKER AND GAVEL 1999 9 an attack on the nation and its values, and a hunger for mass involvement in anticrime action became the battle cries of a nation who once glamorized organized crime, and who now whole-heatedly denounced it by glamorizing the crimefighter. Crime during the 1950s was still propelled by racketeers associated with organized crime gangs. The popularity of anti-crime measures introduced by the mediated glamorization of Hoover and the “G-Man” myth did not stop violent crimes in America from rising. Corrupt law enforcement officers joined organized crime groups by taking “kick-backs” from crime bosses for not interrupting their crime business. Here the virtues of the society are threatened internally. Frustrated with the corruption within the law enforcement community, Senator Estes Kefauver introduced in 1951 Senate Resolution 202, calling for an investigation of organized crime in the United States. This investigation propelled Kefauver’s career and lifted him from a relatively obscure and conscientious and hard-working junior senator, to a position of national prominence that made him one of the most famous and respected supporters of law and order and a serious contender for the Presidency a few years later (Gorman, 1971). The 1951 Senate Crime Committee Hearings conducted by Kefauver, was a series of televised investigative hearings in several American cities. Millions of people were drawn from their daily activity to the television screen to view the proceedings of the Senate Crime Committee. Moreover, previously obscure politicians participating in the hearings found themselves suddenly transformed into popular national symbols of law and order (Garay, 1978). Kefauver, the most celebrated member of the committee, was transformed by the influence of television as a “video knight in armor,” and in 1951 Kefauver was awarded two Emmy’s from the Academy of Television Arts and Sciences for best public affairs program and special achievement. The special achievement award was a symbolic boost for Kefauver’s career. According to Look magazine, Kefauver deserved the Emmy’s “for bringing the workings of our government in the homes of the American people” (Gorman, 1971). The influence television had on the committee hearings not only effected Kefauver’s political career, but also it significantly effected the lives of the millions of people who watched the hearings. Public response to the televised New York City hearings, if measured in both volume and manner of attention given the daily telecasts, was nothing short of spectacular. Because of the televised crime hearings: housewives formed listening clubs and held television parties while they delayed shopping until after the hearings had recessed. Public officials, business executives, and secretaries were found crowded around any available television set. Several motion picture theaters in the city canceled regularly scheduled movies and instead projected the Crime Committee hearings onto their screens while admitting the public free of charge. (Garay, 1978) Because of the popularity of the televised committee hearings, Kefauver’s “law and order” image became a battle cry that propelled his bid for the 1952 presidency. Kefauver’s candidacy demonstrated his initial interest in investigating organized crime. In his book Crime in America, Kefauver explains how his passion for “law and order” became the reason for calling the investigation: 10 SPEAKER AND GAVEL 1999 for some years . . . I had been troubled by the unpleasant realization that there was a tie-up between crime and politics . . . Later, as a member of the House of Representatives, I was named chairman of the Judiciary subcommittee to investigate the conduct of a crooked federal district judge in Pennsylvania. In the process of gathering evidence . . . the full import of what rottenness in public life can do to our country came home to me. From then on the subject never was far from my mind. (p. 1-2) Kefauver’s bid for the presidency demonstrated this commitment, and combined with his honest and hard-working image, Kefauver was leading Adali Stevenson for the Democratic nomination for president going into the national convention. Although Stevenson received the nomination for President by the end of the convention, Kefauver’s honest and hard-working law and order image—an image fueled by television—helped shape the law and order myth. But television was not solely responsible for Kefauver’s popularity. America’s system of law and order was threatened by internal corruption. The American public saw Kefauver as the virtuous American citizen capable cleaning up the threat to America’s virtual core (Garay, 1978). The influence of television and film on the on the careers of “law and order” supporters Hoover and Kefauver, demonstrates examples of a long tradition in mass communication research investigating the effects of media, particularly television and newspaper, with the formation of public opinion (Stroman & Seltzer, 1985; Carlson, 1983; O’Keefe & Reid-Nash, 1987; Prichard, 1985; Ammons, Dimmick, & Pilotta, 1982). Paramount in these research studies is the assumption that the public utilizes information appearing in the media for the formation of opinions about and perceptions of a given phenomenon (Stroman & Seltzer, 1985). More importantly however, is how the media rhetorically communicates the “law and order” myth while at the same time reinforcing the American value system by illustrating crime threats as external factors not part of the virtuous society. In essence, the media coverage about Hoover’s “G-Man” image and Kefauver’s leadership role in ending law enforcement corruption illustrates how law and order differentiates the “other” from the virtuous citizenship. Hoover’s though image and Kefauver’s rhetoric of intolerance exemplifies how distinctions are made between the law-abiding and the law-breaking. It is in this distinction that the “law and order” myth takes root. Law and order becomes a symbolic and mediated manifestation of difference; invoking and reinforcing a perception of “other.” Law and Order and the “Other” Wallace and Nixon on Street Crime The political success of Hoover and Kefauver can, in large part is due, to the coverage of each by television and film. During the 1960s, however, the glitter and glamour associated with “law and order” was tarnished by media coverage of street crimes resembling anti-war riots and civil rights protests. In this context, those who participated in street crime included college students, corrupt law enforcement officials, and “peace” activists. What is distinct about the response to law and order during the 1960s, was that members within and from the virtuous community threatened the virtues of the small-town. The “other” came from within the SPEAKER AND GAVEL 1999 11