Contingent reliance on the affect heuristic as a function of regulatory focus

Results from four studies show that the reliance on affect as a heuristic of judgment and decision making is more pronounced under a promotion focus than under a prevention focus. Two different manifestations of this phenomenon were observed. Studies 1–3 show that different types of affective inputs are weighted more heavily under promotion than under prevention in person-impression formation, product evaluations, and social recommendations. Study 4 additionally shows that valuations performed under promotion are more scope-insensitive—a characteristic of affect-based valuations—than valuations performed under prevention. The greater reliance on affect as a heuristic under promotion seems to arise because promotion-focused individuals tend to find affective inputs more diagnostic, not because promotion increases the reliance on peripheral information per se. 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. Although decision research has historically focused on the cognitive processes underlying decision making, a growing body of research from multiple disciplines suggests that affective processes play an important role as well. In particular, there is strong evidence that decisions are often based on subjective affective responses to the options, which appear to be seen as indicative of the options’ values (Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1997; Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001; Pham, 1998; Schwarz & Clore, 1983). This process is known as the ‘‘affect heuristic” in behavioral decision research (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2002), the ‘‘How-do-I-feelabout-it?” heuristic in social psychology (Schwarz & Clore, 1988) and consumer research (Pham, 1998), and the ‘‘somatic marker hypothesis” in some neuroscience circles (Damasio, 1994). Behavioral decision research on the affect heuristic has mostly focused on the judgmental implications of relying on subjective affective responses as opposed to cognitive reasoning processes in judgments and decisions (Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000; Hsee & Rottenstreich, 2004; Ratner & Herbst, 2005; Rottenstreich & Hsee, 2001; Tversky & Griffin, 1991). For example, affective valuations of risks have been ll rights reserved. , [email protected] (T. Avnet). found to be less sensitive to probability information compared to cognitive valuations of the same risks (Rottenstreich & Hsee, 2001). Affective evaluations have also been found to be more sensitive to social comparisons than cognitive evaluations (Hsee, Zhang, Yu, & Xi, 2004; Tversky & Griffin, 1991). While research on the distinctive properties of affect-based judgments and decisions has been accumulating rapidly (see Pham, 2007, for a review), much less attention has been paid to the determinants of the reliance on affect in judgments and decisions. In other words, what causes people to rely on their subjective affective responses to make judgments and decisions, to begin with? The purpose of this research is to test the hypothesis that an important determinant of the reliance on affect as a heuristic for evaluations and decisions is the self-regulatory orientation of the decision-maker. Building on recent findings by Pham and Avnet (2004), we propose that the reliance on affect as an evaluation heuristic is more pronounced among decisionmakers with a self-regulatory orientation known as a promotion focus than among those with a self-regulatory orientation known as a prevention focus. This hypothesis was tested in four studies across four different judgment contexts—people impression formations, consumer product evaluations, social recommendations, and contingent valuations of public goods—and using three different operationalizations of the affect heuristic. 268 M.T. Pham, T. Avnet / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 108 (2009) 267–278 Affect and regulatory focus in judgments and decisions Affect as an evaluation heuristic Numerous studies have shown that, even when objective information about the target is held constant, targets are evaluated more favorably and chosen more frequently when they are perceived to elicit pleasant feelings than when they are perceived to elicit unpleasant feelings. This phenomenon has been observed both with feelings that are genuine integral affective responses to the target, such as the emotional feelings elicited by a political candidate (Abelson, Kinder, Peters, & Fiske, 1982) or the excitement elicited by a new movie, and with feelings that arise incidentally, such as feelings from a preexisting mood state (Isen, Shalker, Clark, & Karp, 1978; Pham, 1998; Schwarz & Clore, 1983). Although different explanations have been offered for this phenomenon, several converge toward the notion that subjective affective responses to a target influence its evaluation because these responses are perceived to provide diagnostic information about the target (Schwarz & Clore, 1996). In other words, subjective affective responses to a target are often used as a proxy for the target’s value (Damasio, 1994; Pham, 2004; Slovic et al., 2002). Behavioral decision research has shown that, compared to evaluations based on cognitive assessments, evaluations based on such affective responses exhibit distinct properties (see Pham, 2007, for a review). First, affect-based evaluations tend to be more extreme and polarized than cognitive assessments (Ratner & Herbst, 2005; Sinaceur, Heath, & Cole, 2005; Yeung & Wyer, 2004). Second, affect-based evaluations tend to be less effortful and reached more rapidly (Pham, Cohen, Pracejus, & Hughes, 2001; Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999; Verplanken, Hofstee, & Janssen, 1998). Third, affect-based evaluations tend to be more myopic and present-oriented (Loewenstein, 1996; McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein, & Cohen, 2004). Fourth, affect-based evaluations tend to be less sensitive to the numerical magnitude of the target object—a phenomenon known as scope-insensitivity (Fetherstonhaugh, Slovic, Johnson, & Friedrich, 1997; Hsee & Rottenstreich, 2004)—and less sensitive to the probability that surrounds it—a phenomenon known as probability neglect (Loewenstein et al., 2001; Rottenstreich & Hsee, 2001; Sunstein, 2003). Finally, affect-based evaluations tend to be more reference-dependent in that they are more sensitive to outcome comparisons (Medvec, Madey, & Gilovich, 1995; Mellers, Schwartz, Ho, & Ritov, 1997) and social comparisons (Hsee, Zhang, Yu, & Xi, 2003; Tversky & Griffin, 1991). Previous behavioral decision research on affect has thus mostly focused on analyzing how judgments and decisions based on affect differ from those based on cognitive reasoning processes. However, a full understanding of the role of affect in judgment and decision making also calls for an understanding of the determinants of the reliance on affect as a heuristic. In other words, when are judgments and decisions more likely to be based on affect in the first place? Building on recent work by Pham and Avnet (2004), we propose that one of these determinants is the decision-maker’s regulatory focus. Regulatory-focus theory According to regulatory-focus theory (Higgins, 1987), human self-regulation involves two separate systems: the promotion system, which originates in the regulation of growth and nurturance needs, and the prevention system, which originates in the regulation of protection and security needs. The major distinction between these two systems lies in their strategic orientations in goal pursuit: the promotion system relies primarily on approachoriented strategies, whereas the prevention system relies primarily on avoidance-oriented strategies. Because promotion-focused regulation emphasizes approach-oriented strategies, it is characterized by an eager form of exploration that encourages the seizing of opportunities. In signal detection terms, promotion is geared toward maximizing ‘‘hits” and minimizing ‘‘misses” (‘‘errors of omission”; see Crowe & Higgins, 1997). In contrast, because preventionfocused regulation emphasizes avoidance-oriented strategies, it is characterized by a vigilant form of exploration that stresses caution against mistakes. In signal detection terms, prevention is geared toward maximizing ‘‘correct rejections” and minimizing ‘‘false alarms” (‘‘errors of commission”; Crowe & Higgins, 1997). The relative eagerness of promotion-focused individuals and relative vigilance of prevention-focused individuals is illustrated by the finding that, in recognition tasks, promotion-focused participants exhibit a risky bias, identifying more items as having appeared in the original list and committing more errors of commission, whereas prevention-focused participants exhibit a conservative bias, identifying fewer items as having appeared in the original list and committing more errors of omission (Crowe & Higgins, 1997). Similarly, in simple drawing tasks, promotion-focused individuals exhibit greater speed but lower accuracy, whereas prevention-focused individuals exhibit lower speed but greater accuracy (Förster, Higgins, & Bianco, 2003). Promotion-focused regulation is especially active under the pursuit of ideals, that is, the pursuit of wishes, dreams, and aspirations (Higgins, 1987; Higgins, Roney, Crowe, & Hymes, 1994). Prevention-focused regulation is more active under the pursuit of oughts, that is, the fulfillment of responsibilities, duties, and obligations (Higgins, 1987; Higgins et al., 1994). It is important to note that promotion and prevention are motivational states, not personality traits. Both systems are assumed to coexist in every person and to be independent of each other. However, one or the other may be temporarily or chronically more active in a given individual. A promotion focus can be temporarily activated, for example, by priming a person’s ideals (e.g., Higgins et al., 1994; Pham & Avnet, 2004) or by framing a task in an approach-oriented manner (e.g., Roney, Higgins, & Shah, 1995). Similarly, a prevention focus can be temporarily activated by priming a person’s oughts or by framing a task in an avoidance-oriented manner. Promotion, prevention, and the reliance on the affect heuristic Several lines of argument suggest that the eager form of selfregulation that characterizes a promotion focus should encourage the reliance on affect in judgments and decisions, whereas the vigilant form of self-regulation that characterizes prevention should discourage this reliance. First, promotion-induced eagerness has been found to encourage the use of heuristics in general (Friedman & Förster, 2001) and to trigger an emphasis on speed over accuracy when the two are in conflict (Förster et al., 2003). To the extent that subjective affective responses provide a compelling means of evaluation that also tends to be more rapid and less effortful (Pham, Cohen et al., 2001; Verplanken et al., 1998; Zajonc, 1980), a promotion focus should encourage reliance on the affect heuristic. Relatedly, a prevention focus has been found to foster more analytical processing (Friedman & Förster, 2000), which should discourage reliance on the more holistic affect heuristic. Finally, states of eagerness have been found to encourage the reliance on internal inputs as opposed to external information, whereas states of vigilance have been found to produce the reverse (Bless, Mackie, & Schwarz, 1992; Bless, Schwarz, Clore, Golisano, & Rabe, 1996). To the extent that subjective affective responses are internal reactions to the environment as opposed to external information, reliance on such internal reactions should increase under promotion compared to prevention. M.T. Pham, T. Avnet / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 108 (2009) 267–278 269 It is therefore proposed that an important determinant of whether decision-makers will rely on affect as an evaluation heuristic is their regulatory focus. A promotion focus will increase the reliance on affect in judgments and decisions, whereas a prevention focus will decrease it. This proposition should not be interpreted as meaning that promotion increases the reliance on nondiagnostic inputs or ‘‘peripheral cues” per se, nor that prevention increases the reliance on diagnostic inputs or ‘‘central information” per se. Rather, the proposition concerns the reliance on affective inputs in particular. In fact, we believe that promotion increases the reliance on affective inputs precisely because these inputs are perceived to be more diagnostic (‘‘central”) under promotion than under prevention (see Pham & Avnet, 2004). Initial support for this general proposition comes from a series of studies conducted in a nondecision making context by Pham and Avnet (2004). In these persuasion studies, the authors examined how consumers’ regulatory focus moderates the persuasive impact of two types of information in advertisements: the visual aesthetic of the ad and the strength of product claims featured in the ad. Pham and Avnet (2004) found that the aesthetic of the ad had stronger influence on product evaluations under promotion than under prevention, whereas the strength of the product claims had stronger influence under prevention than under promotion. Pham and Avnet (2004) concluded that promotion increases the influence of affective information in persuasion, whereas prevention increases the influence of substantive information. These findings are generally consistent with the proposition that, compared to prevention, promotion increases reliance on the affect heuristic in judgment and decision making. However, these findings leave a number of issues unaddressed. First, given that the Pham and Avnet (2004) studies were conducted in a persuasion setting, it is not clear that these findings would generalize to a broader range of judgments and decisions. Second, these studies focused on only one type of affective information: the aesthetic appeal of the ad. To demonstrate that promotion increases the reliance on affect in general, it is important to generalize these results to a broader range of affective inputs. In addition, one could argue that an increased influence of the ad’s aesthetic under promotion does not necessarily indicate an increased reliance on affect. It may alternatively indicate an increased reliance on any peripheral persuasion cue, whether affective (e.g., backgroundmusic) or cognitive (e.g., source credibility), whereas we argue that promotion does not increase the reliance on peripheral cues per se. Finally, the Pham and Avnet (2004) studies examined only one aspect of the reliance on affect as heuristic, namely the greater weighting of affective input. Support for the hypothesis that promotion increases the reliance on affect as a heuristic would be stronger if other aspects of this reliance were demonstrated. In the present research, this hypothesis was tested across four studies. In the first study, it was tested in the context of personimpression formation. This context was chosen for two reasons. First, it allows us to evaluate whether the basic proposition extends beyond persuasion settings and generalizes to a broader range of judgments and decisions. Second, the person-impression formation context is one in which affective inputs (e.g., a person’s likeability) are more comparable to ‘‘cognitive” inputs (e.g., the person’s perceived competence) in terms of diagnosticity. In the second study, the hypothesis was tested in yet another context: consumer product evaluations. To provide a more direct test of the idea that promotion increases the weight attached to affect in particular (as opposed to other types of information), in this study the weight attached to affect was examined by manipulating participants’ mood as they evaluated the target. In the third study, the hypothesis was tested in the context of social recommendations. To test the idea that promotion-focused individuals attach greater weight to affective inputs indeed because they see them as diagnostic and not because these inputs are peripheral, the perceived relevance of affective information about the target was manipulated. The final study tested the hypothesis in yet another context: that of contingent valuations of the public good. Whereas in the first three studies the reliance on affect as a heuristic was examined by comparing the weights attached to affective inputs under promotion vs. prevention, in the fourth study the reliance on affect as a heuristic was examined through a very different means. A distinctive characteristic of affect-based evaluations is that they tend to be more insensitive to the quantitative scope of the target stimulus than cognitive evaluations of the same stimuli. Building on this result, Study 4 tested the prediction that valuations performed under a promotion focus would be more scopeinsensitive than valuations performed under a prevention focus. In Studies 1 and 2, regulatory focus was measured as a chronic individual difference variable. In Studies 3 and 4, it was manipulated experimentally.