Discrete Concavity for Potential Games

نویسنده

  • Takashi Ui
چکیده

This paper proposes a discrete analogue of concavity appropriate for potential games with discrete strategy sets. It guarantees that every Nash equilibrium maximizes a potential function. JEL classification: C72.

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عنوان ژورنال:
  • IGTR

دوره 10  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2008