The Non-Constant-Sum Colonel Blotto Game

نویسندگان

  • Brian Roberson
  • Dmitriy Kvasov
  • Dan Kovenock
  • Wolfgang Leininger
  • Richard T. Farmer
چکیده

We have benefited from the helpful comments of Dan Kovenock, Wolfgang Leininger, and participants in the presentation at the CESifo Summer Institute Workshop on Advances in the Theory of Contests and its Applications. Brian Roberson Miami University, Department of Economics, Richard T. Farmer School of Business, 208 Laws Hall, Oxford, OH 45056-3628 USA t: 513-529-0416, f: 513-529-8047, E-mail: [email protected] (Correspondent)

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تاریخ انتشار 2008