Relativism, Value-freedom and the Sociology of Science

Since its inception in the work of the classical social theorists, the sociology of knowledge—or as some would prefer, of belief—has generated an extensive array of debates about relativism. A central question has been whether the very existence of social determinants for beliefs makes it impossible to regard them as true or rational in any absolute sense, and this has proved especially contentious in the case of scientific beliefs, at least for the many who, whilst happily conceding some form of relativism for moral and political beliefs, are loath to accept a relativist view of science. Hence, if the social determination of beliefs does entail relativism, and scientific or cognitive relativism is to be avoided, definite limits must he placed upon the legitimate domain of inquiry for a sociology of belief. It must confine itself to the study of nonscientific beliefs, among which may perhaps also he included the results of quite clearly defective or spurious attempts at science.