An impossibility theorem for paired comparisons
نویسنده
چکیده
In several decision-making problems, alternatives should be ranked on the basis of paired comparisons between them. We present an axiomatic approach for the universal ranking problem with arbitrary preference intensities, incomplete and multiple comparisons. In particular, two basic properties – independence of irrelevant matches and self-consistency – are considered. It is revealed that there exists no ranking method satisfying both requirements at the same time. The impossibility result holds under various restrictions on the set of ranking problems, however, it does not emerge in the case of round-robin tournaments. An interesting and more general possibility result is obtained by restricting the domain of independence of irrelevant matches through the concept of macrovertex. JEL classification number: C44, D71 AMS classification number: 15A06, 91B14
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عنوان ژورنال:
- CoRR
دوره abs/1612.00186 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2016