Conceptual Truths, Strong Possibilities and Our Knowledge of Metaphysical Necessities

I argue that there is a reliable epistemic route from knowledge of conceptual truths to knowledge of metaphysical necessities. In a first step, I argue that we possess knowledge of conceptual truths since we know what (many of) our terms apply to. I bolster this line of thought with a rebuttal of Williamson’s recent argument against epistemic analyticity. In a second step, I argue that our knowledge of conceptual truths allows us to reliably attain knowledge of metaphysical necessities. Either this knowledge straightforwardly yields knowledge of metaphysical necessities. Or it is such that we can by armchair semantic reflection discover that it fails to do so. I conclude that conceptual knowledge provides a safe route to modal knowledge. Philosophia Scientiæ, 16 (2), 2012, 39–58.