active intellect in aristotle’s view

it is said that the theory of active intellect is among the most ambiguous and controversial topics of aristotle’s philosophy. this ambiguity is generally regarded as being resulted from the brevity and vagueness of aristotle’s speech in his on the soul. however; is the ambiguity of aristotle’s speech to such an extent that the active intellect attributed to him can be regarded as separate from the soul and as having a content consisting of all rational forms, as regarded by some of his successors and commentators? by presenting an analytical discussion, it is indicated in this article that aristotle’s active intellect is neither separate from intellect nor containing rational a priori content. rather, it includes an aspect of the intellect’s power and function; an intellect that is simple and indivisible and therefore a single reality with two functions: 1. accepting the ideas of reason (that is passive in this respect); 2. intellectualization of the ideas potentially existent in perception (that is active in this respect).