a research on the nature of aṣl-i muḥriz (confirming principle) with an emphasis on the perspectives of muḥaqqiq nā’īnī and shahīd ṣadr

although ‘allāma ḥillī and shaykh anṣārī have pointed out the feature of confirmation (iḥrāz) in some of the practical principles, its refinement has been one of mīrzā-yi nā’īnī’s initiatives. he divided the practical principles into “confirming and non-confirming. the confirming principle determines the practical duty of the religiously ccountable (mukallaf) in view of reality, such as: istiṣḥāb (presumption of continuity), principle of soundness (ṣiḥḥat), and the principle of leisure and violation (firāq wa tajāwuz); however, if reality is not taken into consideration, it is called “non-confirming principle, such as: barā’at (disavowal) and takhyīr (choosing between two or more alternatives). concerning these principles, muḥaqqiq nā’īnī maintains that the principle that represents something dubious as real is tanzīlī (substituted) principle, such as principality of ritual purification (ṭaḥāra) and principality of lawfulness; and when, it maintains doubt, and probability as certitude, like istiṣḥāb, it would be regarded as confirming principle. there are many objections posed against the views of muḥaqqiq nā’īnī, among which are the objections by muḥaqqiq khū’ī and ‘allāma shahīd ṣadr. the latter does not accept nā’īnī’s confirming principle and uses this term in another sense. knowing the distinction between the principles and authority of denotations (amārāt) as the difference in their provision criteria, he interprets the confirming principle as such. the most important outcome of the confirming principle is its precedence over non-confirming principle in contradictions. stating the distinction between the principles and denotations from the viewpoint of nā’īnī and ṣadr, the writer seeks to elucidate the nature of “confirming principle” and its outcome from the viewpoints of these two scholars.