the authority of the contradictories as to reject a third verdict

one of the issues raised in jurisprudence is that two reasons are terminated if they are contradictory. however, as regards the rejection of a third verdict in concomitance with those two reasons: in case of its authority a referral to generalities and predications and practical principles is not possible, while in the absence of its authority, it is possible to refer to these issues. this paper examines the foundations of authority and non-authority as to reject a third verdict, and analyzes the practical implications of either choice in jurisprudential discussions. the most important reason highlighted by those supporting the authority to reject a third verdict is the independence of implicit (subjunctive) indication from explicit (corroborative) indication in the context of authority, while those who advocate its non-authority emphasize the dependence and compliance of implicit indication with explicit one as regards authority. in this article, we find the notion of non-authority as to reject a third verdict effectively challenged and ultimately prefer the idea of authority. indeed, this shall not be in terms of implicit indication and its independence from explicit one as proposed by most of the usulites; instead, this is because of the shared unity of two contradictories in their rejection of a third. this last issue will be achieved only if the contradiction of two reasons is inherently essential; whereas in cases of cross-sectional contradiction, two conflicting reasons shall not be united or unanimous in their rejection of a third, and as a result, there will be authority for this rejection.