critique of miskawayh’s viewpoint concerning humanity’s index and its relation to virtue and happiness on the basis of the qur’ān and ḥadīth

miskawayh regards intellect as the essence and non-material substance of human soul and mentions “virtue” as the sovereignty of intellect over the faculties of the soul (nafs) and its actions, the resul of which is the freedom of intellect in dealing with theoretical contemplations and the outcome of these contemplations is “wisdom”, that is the “happiness” of the soul. therefore, happiness relies on the theoretical aspect of intellect; and virtue, which is the outcome of the practical mode of intellect, functions as its prelude. however, in the verses and traditions, human virtue and happiness is, on one hand, rooted in intellect and, on the other, man’s will and power of choice between vices and virtue leads to purification (virtue) resulting in salvation (happiness). thus, the semantic dominion of intellect in the lexicology of religion and the pivotal index of human virtue and happiness in the qur’ān, have been the key questions of this research. as such, after determining “man as the opting factor” depicted as the above pivotal index, and after recognizing the meaning of intellect and admitting its originality in virtue and happiness through distinction between truth and falsehood and providence, we have concluded that, contrary to miskawayh’s opinion, virtue does not functions as a prelude to happiness; rather, the criterion for virtue and happiness is one and the same, i.e. acquiring “god-wariness”