regulatory bodies overseeing state financial contracts and their challenges

Financial Contracts and Enforcement

(a) (Limited) Commitment and renegotiation (b) Payments and enforcement are chosen optimally as part of a PBNE (c) Information revelation (d) Stochastic versus deterministic contracts (debt is optimal when commitment is limited) 3. Enforcement and firm finance: Krasa, Sharma and Villamil [7] (a) The model (b) The effect of c on firm finance (c) The effect of η on firm finance

Regulatory and Biosafety Challenges for Vaccines

The global regulatory plan for vaccines provides a unique opportunity to develop safe and effective ones with assured quality. Methods used by regulators address challenges of new products and technologies and also increase understanding of benefits and risks of existing products. First, the laboratory-based regulatory sciences evolve correlates of immunity and safety; or improve the product ch...

Financial Contracts and Occupational Choice

Financial constraints and entrepreneurship are among the key factors affecting economic performance in developing countries. Emphasizing the link between the theory microfoundations and the data, the paper considers a heterogeneous agents model of occupational choice with moral hazard under three Þnancial contract regimes differing in their degree of market incompleteness: savings only, borrowi...

Time-Line in HFEA Developments and Regulatory Challenges: 20 Years of Overseeing Fertility Practices and Research in the UK.

In the wake of political upheaval, the Human Fertilisation and Embryo Authority (HFEA) has faced increasing insecurity over its future as a pivotal regulatory body of fertility practices in the UK. HFEA regulates activities by means of licensing, audit, and inspection of fertility centers and maintaining the Code of Practice, which ensures the optimum undertaking of licensed activities by ferti...

Borrowing to save: can NHS bodies ease financial pressures by terminating PFI contracts?

Supply Contracts with Financial Hedging

We study the performance of a stylized supply chain where two firms, a retailer and a producer, compete in a Stackelberg game. The retailer purchases a single product from the producer and afterward sells it in the retail market at a stochastic clearance price. The retailer, however, is budget constrained and is therefore limited in the number of units that he may purchase from the producer. We...