epistemological value of presential knowledge and removal of related doubts

the warrant of truth has long been drawing the attention of philosophers.in order to find out the truth value one should determine first the criterion of truth. discursive or representational knowledge are related to objects external of mind and so since external circumstances are involved in occurrence of this sort of knowledge, its truth value is diminished. presential knowledge, however, is only dependent to the soul of the knowing agent for which reason its epistemic realm is the very reality and existence, in which the existential correlation of knowledge, knowing agent and object of knowledge put an end to the problem of warrant of truth. some philosophers and scholars have disagreed with this position and raised various objections to it which are all intended to destroy the epistemic value of presential knowledge. some of these objections are originate from explanatory language of knowledge by presence. although the possibility of error is plausible, it is fallacious to extend explanatory force of this type of knowledge to its epistemic function. other objections attempt to violate the epistemic circle of presential knowledge reducing its epistemic function. the source of these doubts is failure to note three characteristics of this knowledge: lack of mediation of any conceptual form; existential relation with soul and that any act of presential knowledge can be of representational interpretation the last being susceptible of error.