government contracts

Tax Contracts and Government Formation

We examine how tax contracts affect government formation and welfare of voters in a parliamentary democracy. A tax contract specifies a range of tax rates a party is committed to if in government. We develop a new model of party competition and show that the introduction of tax contracts has two effects: a perks-reduction effect and a policy-shift effect. The former is dominant in societies wit...

Electronic Negotiation of Government Contracts through Transducers

Business to Government (B2G) e-commerce has increased manifold the opportunities available for entrepreneurs for global trade. The entrepreneurs can deal with businesses around the world, evaluate offers, undertake complex negotiations and realize successful deals in the electronic marketplace. In this paper, we demonstrate how the use of transducers can be very effective for generation, negoti...

A Note on Incentive Functions in Government Procurement Contracts

Government agencies use variants of the first-price sealed-bid auction mechanism to realize low cost, high quality, and on-time delivery when procuring goods and services. In a commonly used approach, agencies announce an incentive function that determines the amount they will pay based on the realized value of an attribute of the work performed, but bids do not explicitly include this attribut...

An Assessment of Factors that Impact Government Oversight of Public-Private Partnership Contracts of the National Iranian Gas Company

One of  success factors of public-private partnership contracts is the effective public supervision on their implementation, including standards to be observed by the private party to the partnership. In other words, a key element in using private sector’s potential is defining activity standards and precise supervision of their implementation. In this research we identify the factors that impa...

PRIVATE MARKETS, CONTRACTS, AND GOVERNMENT PROVISION What Explains the Organization of Local Waste and Recycling Markets?

Modelling 'contracts' between a terrorist group and a government in a sequential game

In this paper, we apply a sequential game to study the possibility of 'contracts' (or at least mutually beneficial arrangements) between a government and a terrorist group. We find equilibrium solutions for complete and incomplete information models, where the government defends and/or provides positive rent, and the terrorist group attacks. We also study the sensitivities of equilibria as a fu...