the concept of torture: unique or different standard (from the international law’s point of view)

since the semantic field of the term “torture” in the international law is taken into consideration, this research does not enter into the domain of the internal law; and approaches only the views of international law. by examining the international documents and jurisprudence of the courts, this hypothesis is studied that despite of the presence of the prevailing standard about the appreciation of the meaning of “torture”, there are other standards adopted by international documents and jurisprudence of the courts. to examine this hypothesis, firstly, the prevailing standard is studied. according to this standard, “torture” is the official behavior or punishment which brings about much pain or suffering and is used to result in special purposes such as collection of information or confession. then, those different standards are examined. based on these standards, “torture” does not have to be necessarily “official”, nor does it concern the “intensity” of the pain or suffering, nor even the “existence” of “pain or suffering”, but the “purposefulness” of torture is rejected. of course, although these approaches are different from each other, they do not contradict with the other one. it means, in the same way, as some judicial or pseudo - judicial authorities have illustrated, these differences can be complementary of each other by choosing a free and broad interpretation. of course, this is the ideal, but the fact is if the judicial or pseudo - judicial authorities do not adopt such an interpretation, potentially, there is a capacity to adopt different methods, different appreciation and inferences of the meaning of “torture” in the international arena which can be propagated and leads to the weakening of the concept and challenging with such behaviors.