distribution of strongest players' free riding strategy in networks

analyzing free riding problem through static games considering homogenous players has been resulted in choosing the free riding strategy as a dominant strategy for the players. in this paper free riding is analyzed through cooperation game imposing non-homogenous players using network models. players would be differentiated by their links with their neighbors in the game. evolutionary game theory especially small-world networks models are used for the analysis. the strongest player is the player with most links in the model. studying the consequences of choosing free riding strategy by the strongest player is the foremost concept of this work. after proposing definition for strength of players, we continue to examine distribution of choosing free riding strategy by the strongest player. due to the strength of the well-linked player and the structure of network, results would be different in terms of having monomorphic or polymorphic final forms. in addition, we continue the discussion using the proposed model to analyze the decision which has been made through 166th opec meeting on nov. 2014 regarding maintaining production level as was agreed in dec 2011.