indirect reference theory on “existence” and “existent” differentiation (with an emphasis on mulla sadra and allameh tabatabaei’s views)

this paper addresses the differences between the two terms, “existence” and “existent”, in the framework of “indirect reference theory” and tries to answer whether or not the proposition “existence is existent” is an analytical one. the research shows that on the vocabulary level, none of the two has any additional presentation to the other. also, when by “existence” we mean “nominal existence”, their two referents are the same. but, on the sense level, i.e., the mode of presentation or grasping the referent, “existence” and “existent” are different, and, so, the proposition “existence is existent” cannot not be an analytical one. but, when “existence” refers to “the necessary existence”, the senses are the same, and the proposition is an analytic one. moreover, we also show that the “existent” sense in mulla sadra’s philosophical system is different from the tabatabaei’s one.