zagzebski's moral theory: exemplarist virtue theory

linda zagzebski presents a new kind of foundational moral theory in her exemplarist virtue theory which exemplary persons have considered as the foundation. in this theory all of the basic moral concepts such as good ends and right acts are defined by direct reference to paradigmatically good person. one of the most important consequences of this theory is that moral propositions are a posteriori and because of that the theory gives special attention to narrative ethics. by emphasizing the significant functions of emotions in morality, zagzebski tries to show that paradigmatically good persons are identified by the emotion of admiration. she believes that the emotion is a kind of perception that has both cognitive and affective aspects. since this theory is based on the attractiveness of the good, it can provide an attractive foundation for ethics. because of this matter, zagzebski considers this theory better and more justifiable than other moral theories. this article seeks to give a brief review of zagzebski's moral theory, express the considerations of other philosophers about her theory and in the end show the important problems that undermine the justifiability and acceptability of it.