a simple semi-dynamic cooperative bargaining approach

the area of bargaining mechanisms has been well explored in both multi-agent systems and economics. in bargaining, participants raise/reduce their offers until an agreement is hopefully reached. in this dynamic environment, finding superior agreements without having the knowledge about the strategic private information of the counterpart is considerable. in this paper, we present a simple semi-dynamic cooperative bargaining, which deals with bargaining of single-buyer and single-seller in a multi-criteria single-good e-marketplace. both buyer and seller are equipped with medial agents that cooperatively want to win bargaining via a slight maneuver, over their own preferences that are unknown to each other. we show the results obtained using the simulation. this approach shows that the lack of intersection between threshold utility intervals of both parties does not necessarily yield a disagreement. on the other hand, if the party whose utility threshold is lower than the utility threshold of the other party makes the initial offer, the two parties will certainly have an agreement in a single round.