Zero-sum path-dependent stochastic differential games in weak formulation

نویسندگان
چکیده

برای دانلود باید عضویت طلایی داشته باشید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Two Person Zero-Sum Game in Weak Formulation and Path Dependent Bellman-Isaacs Equation

In this paper we study a two person zero sum stochastic differential game in weak formulation. Unlike the standard literature, which uses strategy type controls, the weak formulation allows us to consider the game with control against control. We shall prove the existence of game value under natural conditions. Another main feature of the paper is that we allow for non-Markovian structure, and ...

متن کامل

Definable Zero-Sum Stochastic Games

Definable zero-sum stochastic games involve a finite number of states and action sets, reward and transition functions that are definable in an o-minimal structure. Prominent examples of such games are finite, semi-algebraic or globally subanalytic stochastic games. We prove that the Shapley operator of any definable stochastic game with separable transition and reward functions is definable in...

متن کامل

A Weak Dynamic Programming Principle for Zero-Sum Stochastic Differential Games with Unbounded Controls

We analyze a zero-sum stochastic differential game between two competing players who can choose unbounded controls. The payoffs of the game are defined through backward stochastic differential equations. We prove that each player’s priority value satisfies a weak dynamic programming principle and thus solves the associated fully non-linear partial differential equation in the viscosity sense.

متن کامل

Bias and Overtaking Equilibria for Zero-Sum Stochastic Differential Games

This paper deals with zero-sum stochastic differential games with long-run average payoffs. Our main objective is to give conditions for existence and characterization of bias and overtaking optimal equilibria. To this end, first we characterize the family of optimal average payoff strategies. Then, within this family, we impose suitable conditions to determine the subfamilies of bias and overt...

متن کامل

Stochastic Recursive Zero-Sum Differential Game and Mixed Zero-Sum Differential Game Problem

Under the notable Issacs’s condition on the Hamiltonian, the existence results of a saddle point are obtained for the stochastic recursive zero-sum differential game and mixed differential game problem, that is, the agents can also decide the optimal stopping time. Themain tools are backward stochastic differential equations BSDEs and double-barrier reflected BSDEs. As the motivation and applic...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: The Annals of Applied Probability

سال: 2020

ISSN: 1050-5164

DOI: 10.1214/19-aap1533