WORKING UNDER CONTRACT

Joint Contract under Inequity Aversion

The standard contract theory adopts the traditional hypothesis of pure self-interest. However, a series of game experiments have proven that people are not any self-interest but also inequity averse. Then, how will the inequity aversion influence the optimal contract for multiple agents? This paper attempts to obtain new theoretical insights by incorporating inequity aversion into the standard ...

Optimal Health Care Contract under Physician Agency

We model asymmetric information arising from physician agency, and its effect on the design of payment and health care quantity. The physician-patient coalition aims to maximize a combination of physician profit and patient benefit. The degree of substitution between profit and patient benefit in the physician-patient coalition is the physician’s private information, as is the patient’s intrins...

Working under confinement

We analyze the performance of a Brownian ratchet in the presence of geometrical constraints. A two-state model that describes the kinetics of molecular motors is used to characterize the energetic cost when the motor proceeds under confinement, in the presence of an external force. We show that the presence of geometrical constraints has a strong effect on the performance of the motor. In parti...

Working Paper Department of Economics Breach of Contract, I

Supply Chain Contract Design Under Financial Constraints and Bankruptcy Costs

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