Wittgenstein, Moorean Absurdity and its Disappearance from Speech
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Wittgenstein, Moorean Absurdity and its Disappearance from Speech
G. E. Moore famously observed that to say, I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don’t believe that I did’’ would be ‘‘absurd’’. Why should it be absurd of me to say something about myself that might be true of me? Moore suggested an answer to this, but as I will show, one that fails. Wittgenstein was greatly impressed by Moore’s discovery of a class of absurd but possibly true assertions b...
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Moore’s paradox in belief is the fact that beliefs of the form ‘p and I do not believe that p’ are ‘absurd’ yet possibly true. Writers on the paradox have nearly all taken the absurdity to be a form of irrationality. These include those who give what Timothy Chan calls the ‘pragmatic solution’ to the paradox. This solution turns on the fact that having the Moorean belief falsifies its content. ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Synthese
سال: 2006
ISSN: 0039-7857,1573-0964
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-004-6252-0