WITHDRAWN: Gift giving at Israeli weddings as a function of genetic relatedness and kinship certainty
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چکیده
منابع مشابه
Running head : Gift Giving in Courtship Gift Giving as Costly Signaling in Courtship Contexts
Social scientists from a variety of fields have grappled with questions about why gift giving exists and where its utility comes from because it is economically inefficient. Economic models of sexual relationships (e.g., Baumeister & Vohs, 2004) propose that gifts given by men are motivated by attempts to barter for access to sex. We offer an alternative model, based on costly signaling theory ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Consumer Psychology
سال: 2017
ISSN: 1057-7408
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcps.2017.06.003