Wisdom of the Crowd? Information Aggregation and Electoral Incentives
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Electoral Competition and Information Aggregation
This paper investigates a common criticism of competitive elections: Candidates pander to voters and choose the most popular platform, regardless of it being optimal for the voters. I study an election with two perfectly informed candidates. Voters share common values over the policy outcome of the election, but possess arbitrarily little information about which policy is best for them. Voters ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2017
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2995012