Winner-imposing strategyproof mechanisms for multiple Facility Location games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Winner-Imposing Strategyproof Mechanisms for Multiple Facility Location Games
We study Facility Location games, where a number of facilities are placed in a metric space based on locations reported by strategic agents. A mechanism maps the agents’ locations to a set of facilities. The agents seek to minimize their connection cost, namely the distance of their true location to the nearest facility, and may misreport their location. We are interested in mechanisms that are...
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We consider the problem of locating a facility on a network, represented by a graph. A set of strategicagents have different ideal locations for the facility; the cost of an agent is the distance between its ideallocation and the facility. A mechanism maps the locations reported by the agents to the location of thefacility. Specifically, we are interested in social choice mechan...
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This paper is devoted to the location of public facilities in a metric space. Selfish agents are located in this metric space, and their aim is to minimize their own cost, which is the distance from their location to the nearest facility. A central authority has to locate the facilities in the space, but she is ignorant of the true locations of the agents. The agents will therefore report their...
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We consider a strategic variant of the facility location problem. We would like to locate a facility on a closed interval. There are n agents spread on that interval, divided into two types: type 1 agents, who wish for the facility to be as far from them as possible, and type 2 agents, who wish for the facility to be as close to them as possible. Our goal is to maximize a form of aggregated soc...
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Achieving truth-revealing, also called strategyproofness or incentive compatibility, is fundamental to game theory. The seminal work of Vickery showed a way of achieving this for single item auctions. An extension of Vickery’s idea generales the framework of auctions to the design of strategyproof mechanisms. This goes under the name of Vickery-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, and is perhaps the ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Theoretical Computer Science
سال: 2013
ISSN: 0304-3975
DOI: 10.1016/j.tcs.2012.11.036