Williamson on Gettier Cases and Epistemic Logic
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Williamson on Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic and the Knowledge Norm for Rational Belief: A Reply to a Reply to a Reply
In our reply to Williamson, we offered models where traditional Gettier cases arise but which differ from Williamson’s models in three related respects: first, non-traditional, fake-barn style Gettier cases do not arise in our models; second, knowledge iterates in our models; and, finally, our models do not have the Moorish consequences of Williamson’s models.1 Predictably, Williamson thinks th...
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The term “Gettier Case” is a technical term frequently applied to a wide array of thought experiments in contemporary epistemology. What do these cases have in common? It is said that they all involve a justified true belief which, intuitively, is not knowledge, due to a form of luck called “Gettiering.” While this very broad characterization suffices for some purposes, it masks radical diversi...
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W. V. Quine is one of the most prominent advocates of the naturalistic approach to epistemology and he argues that epistemology should be naturalized and transformed into a sub-discipline of psychology and hence a chapter in science. In his famous paper " Epistemology Naturalized, " Quine starts to compare epistemology with the logical and set-theoretical studies of the foundations of mathemati...
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Gettier cases have played a major role in Anglo-American analytic epistemology over the past fifty years. Philosophers have grouped a bewildering array of examples under the heading “Gettier case.” Philosophers claim that these cases are obvious counterexamples to the “traditional” analysis of knowledge as justified true belief, and they treat correctly classifying the cases as a criterion for ...
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In recent years, some epistemologists have argued that practical factors can make the difference between knowledge and mere true belief. While proponents of this pragmatic thesis have proposed necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge, it is striking that they have failed to address Gettier cases. As a result, the proposed analyses of knowledge are either lacking or susceptible to count...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Inquiry
سال: 2013
ISSN: 0020-174X,1502-3923
DOI: 10.1080/0020174x.2013.775012