Will all autonomous cars cooperate? Brands’ strategic interactions under dynamic congestion
نویسندگان
چکیده
• Investigate the strategic interactions of multiple car brands, which provide both autonomous and normal cars. Propose a two-stage game theoretic model for duopoly competition, with first choice cooperation strategy then Bertrand competition imperfect substitutes. Reveal brands’ incentives pricing decisions under four market structures: perfect public monopoly, private monopoly. Analyze welfare effects different structures. Autonomous cars allow safe driving smaller headway than that required human-driven cars, thereby potentially improving road capacity. To attain this capacity benefit, among is vital. However, future may have brands incentive them to cooperate unknown. This paper investigates between that, vehicles. We develop game-theoretic investigate evaluate, from policy organizational perspectives, implications their competition. compare welfare-maximizing profit-maximizing Various parameters are evaluated, including factors such as benefits cooperation, cost price elasticity. evaluation provides insights into actions could be considered by regulators organizations operation
منابع مشابه
Congestion Attacks to Autonomous Cars Using Vehicular Botnets
The increasing popularity and acceptance of VANETs will make the deployment of autonomous vehicles easier and faster since the VANET will reduce dependence on expensive sensors. However, these benefits are counterbalanced by possible security attacks. We demonstrate a VANET-based botnet attack in an autonomous vehicle scenario that can cause serious congestion by targeting hot spot road segment...
متن کاملAirlines’ strategic interactions and airport pricing in a dynamic bottleneck model of congestion
This paper analyzes efficient pricing at a congested airport dominated by a single firm. Unlike much of the previous literature, we combine a dynamic bottleneck model of congestion and a vertical structure model that explicitly considers the role of airlines and passengers. We show that a Stackelberg leader interacting with a competitive fringe partially internalizes congestion, and that there ...
متن کاملDynamic strategic interactions: analysis and mechanism design
Modern systems, such as engineering systems with autonomous entities, markets, and financial networks, consist of self-interested agents with potentially conflicting objectives. These agents interact in a dynamic manner, modifying their strategies over time to improve their payoffs. The presence of self-interested agents in such systems, necessitates the analysis of the impact of multi-agent de...
متن کاملStrategic Experimentation with Congestion
We consider a multi-armed bandit model in which two players choose between learning about the quality of a risky option (modelled as a Poisson process with unknown arrival rate), and competing for the use of a single shared safe option that can only be used by one agent at the time. Firstly, when players cannot reverse their decision to switch to the safe option, the socially optimal policy mak...
متن کاملDriverless Cars will Make Rails Obsolete
Driverless vehicles will be common on the road in a short time. They will have many impacts on the global transport market trends. One of the remarkable driverless vehicles impacts will be the laying aside of rail systems, because of several reasons, that is to say traffic congestions will be no more a justification for rail, rail will not be the best answer for disableds, air pollution of cars...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Transportation Research Part E-logistics and Transportation Review
سال: 2022
ISSN: ['1366-5545', '1878-5794']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tre.2022.102825